Safety Aspects of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in Arctic and Sub-Arctic Waters by TARANTOLA STEFANO et al.
  
 
Safety Aspects of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Operations in Arctic and Sub-Arctic 
Waters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tarantola, S., Rossotti, A., Flitris, E. 
2019 
EUR 29572 EN 
  
This publication is a Technical report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. It 
aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a 
policy position of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is 
responsible for the use that might be made of this publication. For information on the methodology and quality underlying the data used 
in this publication for which the source is neither Eurostat nor other Commission services, users should contact the referenced source. The 
designations employed and the presentation of material on the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part 
of the European Union concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation 
of its frontiers or boundaries. 
 
Contact information 
Name: Marcelo Masera 
Address: European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Westerduinweg 3, 1755 ZG Petten, The Netherlands 
Email: marcelo.masera@ec.europa.eu 
Tel.: (+31) 224 565403 
 
EU Science Hub 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc  
 
 
JRC114560 
 
EUR 29572 EN 
 
 
PDF ISBN 978-92-79-98398-6 ISSN 1831-9424 doi:10.2760/866261 
    
 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019  
 
© European Union, 2019  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The reuse policy of the European Commission is implemented by the Commission Decision 2011/833/EU of 12 December 2011 on the 
reuse of Commission documents (OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39). Except otherwise noted, the reuse of this document is authorised under 
the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This means that 
reuse is allowed provided appropriate credit is given and any changes are indicated. For any use or reproduction of photos or other 
material that is not owned by the EU, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders. 
 
All content © European Union, 2019, except: [cover page: pixabay.com; incredible Arctic, fotolia.com]; [images in chapters 2, 6, and 7, 
sources mentioned inside the document]  
 
 
How to cite this report: Tarantola, S., Rossotti, A., Flitris, E., Safety Aspects of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in Arctic and sub-arctic 
Waters, EUR 29572 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2019, ISBN 978-92-79-98398-6, doi:10.2760/866261, 
JRC114560. 
 
 i 
Contents 
Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 
1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 
2 The Arctic area ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5 
2.1 Geographical description of the Arctic area ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 
2.2 The Arctic climate........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9 
2.3 Spatial distribution of Oil & Gas fields ................................................................................................................................................................ 11 
2.4 Arctic continental shelf claims..................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 
2.4.1 Arctic Territorial or Maritime Disputes which have been resolved ......................................................................... 15 
2.4.2 Arctic Territorial or Maritime Disputes which remain unresolved ........................................................................... 16 
2.5 Drilling activities ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 17 
2.6 Costs of oil production in the Arctic Seas ......................................................................................................................................................... 18 
2.6.1 Factors that shape the prices of Arctic oil production ........................................................................................................ 18 
2.6.2 Market conditions ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 18 
3 Winterisation standards................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 20 
3.1 DNV GL rules for mobile offshore units ............................................................................................................................................................. 20 
3.2 DNV GL offshore Arctic standards ........................................................................................................................................................................... 21 
3.3 Anti-icing and anti-freezing measures ................................................................................................................................................................ 24 
3.4 De-icing measures .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 24 
3.5 Selection of metallic material ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 26 
3.6 Selection of non-metallic material and electronic components .................................................................................................. 26 
3.7 Other technical issues and solutions ..................................................................................................................................................................... 26 
4 Pollution in the Arctic environment from offshore Oil & Gas activities ............................................................................................ 28 
5 Safety and contingency plans in the Arctic ................................................................................................................................................................... 33 
5.1 The safety issue ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 33 
5.2 Contingency plans .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 35 
6 Accidents on Arctic and sub-Arctic offshore installations .............................................................................................................................. 38 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 38 
6.2 Accident Database................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 39 
6.3 Landmark Accidents .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 45 
6.3.1 Kolskaya jack-up drilling rig (Sea of Okhotsk, 17 Dec 2011) ...................................................................................... 45 
6.3.2 Kulluk conical drilling rig (Gulf of Alaska, 31 Dec 2017) ................................................................................................. 47 
7 Recent research activities .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 50 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 50 
7.2 In Situ Burning (ISB) ............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 51 
7.3 Dispersants ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 53 
7.4 Mechanical Containment & Recovery (C&R)................................................................................................................................................... 55 
7.5 Selection of Oil Spill Response Strategy ............................................................................................................................................................ 57 
 ii 
7.6 Detection & Monitoring of Oil Spills ....................................................................................................................................................................... 57 
8 Questionnaire on safety aspects for offshore Oil & Gas operations in the Arctic .................................................................. 61 
9 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 68 
References ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 70 
List of figures ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 75 
List of tables ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 76 
Annexes .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 77 
Annex 1. Potential impacts of an accident in an offshore Oil & Gas installation .................................................................... 77 
Annex 2. Landmark accidents in offshore Oil & Gas installations ......................................................................................................... 78 
Annex 3. List of Oil Spill Prevention & Response Research Projects .................................................................................................... 83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Executive Summary 
This report prepared by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission is the second part of a dilogy 
which aims to be a compendium for regulators in the offshore oil and gas sector and an informative reading 
for the community.  
While the first report1 of the dilogy describes the safety principles, the methods of risk assessment and a 
state-of-the-art of the technologies and procedures for the prevention of accidents and emergency response 
for offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation activities in temperate climates, the present report 
reviews the extraordinary challenges that offshore oil and gas operators face in the extremely harsh and 
vulnerable areas of the Arctic and sub-Arctic waters.  
Operations in extreme conditions require specialized technology, assets, management and procedures, 
including awareness of safety principles, preparedness to mitigate consequences of accidents and execution 
of emergency response plans. A crucial role is played by the human factor, in that extreme conditions require 
well-trained and well-equipped personnel for ensuring a successful implementation of the safety procedures. 
These aspects pose new challenges to the oil and gas industry when operating in Arctic waters. 
The review is based on the retrieval and analysis of a large number of open source information, along with 
input from authorities, oil and gas operators and the Arctic Committee of IOGP, the International Association 
of Oil and Gas Producers. The information collected has been organised with the aim of offering the readers 
an overview of the required means and resources for operating in extreme conditions as well as addressing 
them to more specific and technical publications covering the same aspects.   
In order to gather practical information on how operators respond to challenges likely to be encountered in 
the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions, a technical questionnaire was submitted to oil & gas companies operating in 
such areas thanks to the support of the Arctic Committee of IOGP, the International Organisation of oil and 
gas producers, which distributed the questionnaire to the operators and delivered a summary of the individual 
replies to the JRC. 
The outcome of the questionnaire shows the approach adopted by operators in terms of health, safety and 
environmental risk management, emergency preparedness and response, and the initiatives taken by the 
industry to improve such approaches. The answers of the survey emphasized the commitment adopted by the 
industry in their operations in the Arctic and sub-Arctic waters. 
The harsh environmental conditions and the fragile ecosystem of the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions compel the 
oil and gas industry to carry out offshore operations with the highest safety standards in order to prevent 
accidents that could have tremendous and irreversible consequences on this extremely vulnerable ecosystem. 
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1 Introduction 
The Arctic is a vast region that encompasses over one-sixth of the global landmass, and spans over thirty 
million square kilometres and twenty-four time zones. The global community has begun to give increasing 
attention to this northern expanse, as the warming temperatures are melting the polar ice caps.  
As sea ice recedes, the Arctic gradually offers increased access to natural resources and longer navigation 
seasons, arising global expectations for future economic exploitation of the region. The oil and gas industry is 
also very much interested in carrying out explorations as it is estimated that the Arctic contains 20% of the 
World’s undiscovered, yet recoverable, hydrocarbon reserves.  
Exploiting natural resources in the Arctic and sub-Arctic areas involves managing a number of risks which 
become even more severe when operating in a highly sensitive environment and extreme weather conditions 
(cold, dark, wind, ice, etc.).  
The Arctic remains the most expensive region on Earth for resource exploration and exploitation for a number 
of reasons. Assets must be specially designed to withstand the extremely rigid temperatures, transportation 
of materials and equipment is extremely expensive due to the remoteness of the operations’ areas, higher 
salaries are required to induce highly qualified personnel to work in such inhospitable regions. Finally, 
following the Deep Water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, regulations on offshore drilling have 
been tightened, thereby limiting access and increasing costs further. 
This report intends to be a compendium for regulators and an informative reading for the community about 
the risks of oil and gas exploration and exploitation in Arctic waters, the instruments that are needed to 
reduce as much as possible such risks as well as the emergency response and mitigation measures that have 
to be in place to minimise the consequences of accidents. 
The report is structured as follows. 
Chapter 2 identifies geographically the Arctic region offering a map of the distribution of oil and gas fields 
and recent drilling activities. The special features of the Arctic weather and climate are then described 
highlighting how they determine the safety measures to adopt and, consequently, the high production costs of 
the offshore Arctic oil. The Chapter concludes with an interesting list of both resolved and unresolved disputes 
between Countries on the Arctic continental shelf. 
Chapter 3 explains the concept of winterization, namely the modifications that have to be made on an 
offshore asset for ensuring that this is suitable for working in cold climate conditions, and offers an overview 
of the main international standards in place for winterization.  
Growing exploitation of the Arctic involves, nevertheless, major environmental risks. Chapter 4 offers a review 
on the vulnerability of the Arctic marine environment and the major consequences that oil spills may have in 
this area. 
Chapter 5 expands on the need for ad-hoc assets, specialized technology, dedicated management and 
procedures for operating in the extremely delicate Arctic and sub-Arctic ecosystem. Besides claiming 
awareness of safety principles and adoption of appropriate resources and tools, the chapter focuses on the 
need to be prepared with the instruments for the mitigation of the consequences of major accidents, such as 
the means of containment, recovery and restoration, and with the execution of emergency response plans. 
The chapter provides a number of interesting links where the reader can find additional documentation. 
Chapter 6 offers a glimpse of recent accidents which resulted in oil spills along with a summary of their 
environmental consequences. Links to public investigation reports are also provided for more details. 
Chapter 7 provides an overview of available oil spill response technologies that could be used in the Arctic 
and summarises the most notable research activities of the last decade in this field. 
Finally, in order to gather information on safety activities and emergency response preparedness in case of an 
accident, a questionnaire was submitted to a sample of oil and gas companies operating in Arctic areas, 
thanks to the support of the Arctic Committee of the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 
(IOGP). A summary of the received answers is provided in Chapter 8. 
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2 The Arctic area 
In the present Chapter, the geographical identification of the Arctic is given along with the spatial distribution 
of oil and gas fields and recent drilling activities. The special features of the Arctic weather and climate are 
then described highlighting how they determine the safety measures to adopt and, consequently, the high 
production costs of the offshore Arctic oil. The Chapter concludes with an interesting list of both resolved and 
unresolved disputes between Countries on the Arctic continental shelf. 
2.1 Geographical description of the Arctic area 
There is no common definition of exactly what area the Arctic encompasses. Out of the literature review, 
several definitions of the Arctic area can be given, depending on the application each definition is referred to 
(e.g. politics, maritime, fishing, agriculture). The most widely used geographical indicators of the Arctic region 
are the following: 
 The Arctic Circle. This is the most widely used indicator to define the Arctic area but also the less 
accurate as it does not take into consideration any climatological or other geographical variations. 
According to this indicator, Arctic is defined as any land north of the Arctic Circle (above the latitude 
of 66° 33’ 44”). Eight countries share the land within the Arctic Circle. These are Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Russia, U.S.A. (Alaska), Canada, Denmark (Greenland) and Iceland. Nevertheless, only five 
countries border the Arctic Ocean and have exclusive rights to the sea bottom and resources below. 
The Arctic Five consists of Norway, Russia, U.S.A., Canada and Denmark. 
 The 10°C July Isotherm. This geographical indicator delimits Arctic areas according to 
climatological criteria. Subsequently, Arctic is defined as any land north of the regions where the 
average daily temperature in July doesn’t rise above 10°C.   
 The Treeline. This geographical indicator is based on vegetation criteria and subsequently can be 
applied only in terrestrial areas. According to this indicator, Arctic is defined as any land north of the 
treeline, a northern limit beyond which trees do not grow. The Arctic landmass north of the treeline is 
divided into the Low Arctic and the High Arctic. Additionally, south of the Low Arctic area there is a 
transition zone between the treeline and the continuous boreal forests which is called Sub Arctic. 
The aforementioned geographical definitions of Arctic are respectively represented in Figure 2.1 by the dotted 
blue line (Arctic Circle), the red line (Isotherm) and the green one (Treeline). Source: 
https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arctic. 
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Figure 2 1. Map showing three different geographical definitions of the Arctic region. (Source: CIA World Factbook) 
For the present study it is necessary to introduce another geographical indicator to define which seas around 
the North Pole are Arctic and sub-Arctic seas. This indicator, based on the seasonality of the sea ice, allows us 
to define:   
 The Arctic Seas where a continuous sea ice cap is present all around the year.   
 The Sub Arctic Seas where sea ice occurrence is always seasonal. 
The delimitation of the Arctic and Sub Arctic seas is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The dark grey area represents the 
permanently frozen Arctic Seas whereas the lighter grey areas represent the Sub Arctic Seas where sea ice is 
formed only seasonally. (Source: Book titled “Sea Ice” published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 652pp, 2017).  
It must be noticed that several water masses with very low latitude get frozen during the winter months like 
the Sea of Okhotsk or the Caspian Sea. This is attributed to the surrounding land masses with below freezing 
temperatures. For the purposes of the present report, these water masses will also be considered as sub-
Arctic Seas. In Table 2.1 the basic features of the seasonal sea ice in some major sub-Arctic Seas are 
presented. 
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Figure 2 2 Map of sea ice extent in the northern hemisphere. Dark grey depicts the extent in the summer whereas lighter 
grey depicts the seasonal (winter) sea ice zone. (Source: Sea Ice, 2017) 
Table 2 1 Basic features of the sea ice cover in some major sub-Arctic Seas (Source: Sea Ice, 2017) 
Sub-Arctic  
Sea 
Total sea 
area  
(x106 km2) 
Maximum ice 
extent                      
(% of the area) 
Highest 
latitude 
(ON) 
Maximum ice 
thickness 
range (m) 
Average ice 
season 
length (days 
with ice) 
Sea of Okhotsk 1.530 50 - 90 62 0.5 – 1.5 180 
Hudson Bay 0.830 95 - 100 64 1.0 – 2.0 275 
Baltic Sea 0.377 10 - 100 66 0.1 – 1.2 180 
The Arctic Ocean covers most of the Arctic area. It is the shallowest ocean (mean depth 1.361m) and has 
significantly larger continental shelves than other oceans. The Laptev and East Siberian Seas are the 
shallowest (mean depths 48m and 58m respectively). The Lincoln Sea and the adjacent area of the Northern 
Canadian Arctic Archipelago are the deepest portions of the Arctic Ocean shelve seas (mean depths 257m and 
338m respectively). The Arctic Ocean is also the least salty, due to low evaporation and the huge influxes of 
freshwater from rivers and glaciers. The Arctic Ocean has only three connections to the other oceans: 
1. Bering Strait (depth 45m); 
2. Canadian Archipelago (depth 220m); 
3. Fram Strait (depth 2.600m). 
The following web site https://geology.com/world/arctic-ocean-map.shtml shows the Arctic map as well as the 
bathymetric chart of the Arctic Ocean, which is provided in Figure 2.3. The red dotted line indicates the limits 
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of the Arctic Ocean. Abbreviations in Figure 2.3: NB – Nansen Basin, AB – Amundsen Basin, MB – Makarov 
Basin, CB – Canada Basin. 
The Bathymetric Chart was produced by investigators representing the Intergovernmental Oceanographic 
Commission (IOC), the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), the International Hydrographic 
Organization (IHO), the US Office of Naval Research (ONR), and the US National Geophysical Data Centre 
(NGDC). 
 
Figure 2 3 Bathymetric charts of the Arctic seas (Source: Geology.com) 
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2.2 The Arctic climate 
The Arctic weather and climate are influenced by several factors, the most important of which is the solar 
radiation. The amount of solar radiation reaching the Earth varies with the latitude and the cloud cover. Since 
the incident solar radiation decreases from the Equator to the poles, temperature decreases with increasing 
latitude. An interesting plot showing the variation of the duration of the daylight with latitude over the year is 
provided in Figure 2.4, taken from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_of_the_Arctic. 
 
 Figure 2 4 Variations in the duration of daylight with latitude and time of year (Source: Wikipedia) 
 
This figure also shows the latitude of 66° 33’ of the Arctic Circle. Following this line, the number of daylight 
hours can be read for each month of the year.  
The Arctic experiences the extremes of solar radiation. During the Northern Hemisphere’s winter months, the 
Arctic is one of the coldest and darkest places on Earth. Following sunset on the September equinox, the 
Earth’s tilted axis and its revolution around the sun reduce the light and heat reaching the Arctic until no 
sunlight penetrates the darkness at all. The sun rises again during the March equinox, and increases the light 
and heat reaching the Arctic. By the June solstice, the Arctic experiences 24-hour sunshine. 
Therefore, the climate of the Arctic is characterized by long, cold winters and short, cool summers. Some parts 
of the Arctic are always covered by ice whereas others experience long periods with some forms of ice on the 
surface. In winter, temperatures can drop below −50 °C whereas in summer temperatures range from about 
−10 to +10 °C with some land areas occasionally exceeding 30 °C. 
Comparing the two poles of the Earth, the Arctic and the Antarctic, it can be said that the former is mostly an 
ocean surrounded by land whereas the latter is mostly land surrounded by water. The Arctic's thin ice cover 
has water, not land, under it. Subsequently, there is always a small scale heat transfer from the warmer 
water mass under the ice to the Arctic air.  From the other hand, Antarctica has mountains with an average 
elevation of about 7,500 feet (2.3 km) and stronger winds than the Arctic. As a consequence, Arctic clime is 
less cold than that of the Antarctic. 
Wind speeds over the Arctic Basin and the western Canadian Archipelago average between 4 and 6 m/s (14.4 
and 21.6 km/h) in all seasons. Stronger winds do occur in storms but they rarely exceed 25 m/s (90 km/h) in 
these areas. During all seasons, the strongest average winds are found in the North-Atlantic seas, Baffin Bay, 
and Bering and Chukchi Seas, where cyclone activity is most common. On the Atlantic side, the winds are 
strongest in winter, averaging 7 to 12 m/s (25 to 43 km/h, 16 to 27 mph), and weakest in summer, averaging 
5 to 7 m/s (18 to 25 km/h, 11 to 16 mph). On the Pacific side they average 6 to 9 m/s (22 to 32 km/h, 13 to 
20 mph) year round. Maximum wind speeds in the Atlantic region can approach 50 m/s (180 km/h, 110 mph) 
in winter (Przybylak et al., 2003). 
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Water is the Arctic’s biggest resource. Twenty percent of all water of the Earth is tied up in Arctic ice and 
glaciers. The global warming is mostly responsible for the continuous reduction of the extent and thickness of 
the Arctic's sea ice. 
See ice extent and thickness variation over time considering the end of the winter period (March) is provided 
in http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2016/04/march-ends-a-most-interesting-winter/ from which Figure 2.5 
has been extracted, showing the linear rate of decline of 2.7 percent per decade, i.e. a decline of 42,100 
square kilometres (16,200 square miles) per year. 
 
Figure 2 5 Average monthly Arctic sea ice extents in the period from 1979 to 2016 (Source: National Snow and Ice Data 
Center) 
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If the current trend continues, within the next couple of decades it will be possible, during summer, to open 
the Northwest Passage (from the Bearing Sea to the Atlantic Ocean through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago) 
to standard ships. More info and maps can be found in: https://geology.com/articles/northwest-passage.shtml. 
In the Arctic region the ground is at or below 0 °C. This condition is called permafrost (Brown et al.).  According 
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPGC) there is high confidence that permafrost 
temperatures have increased in most regions since the early 1980s. Observed warming was up to 3 °C in 
parts of Northern Alaska (early 1980s to mid-2000s) and up to 2 °C in parts of the Russian European North 
(1971–2010). In the Yukon Territory of Canada the zone of continuous permafrost might have moved 100 
kilometres poleward since 1899. A global temperature rise of 1.5 °C above current levels would be enough to 
start the thawing of permafrost in Siberia. 
It is thought that permafrost thawing could release methane and other hydrocarbons the so called gas 
hydrates, which are powerful greenhouse gases. These gases may contribute to increasing global warming. 
Estimates vary on how many tons of greenhouse gases are emitted from thawed permafrost soils. One 
estimate suggests an average annual emission rate of 4–8 billion tons of CO2 equivalents in the period 
2011–2040 and annually 10–16 billion tons of CO2 equivalents in the period 2011–2100 as a result of 
thawing permafrost. For comparison, the anthropogenic emission of all greenhouse gases in 2010 is 
approximately 48 billion tons of CO2 equivalents. 
The thawed permafrost could also encourage erosion because permafrost lends stability to barren Arctic 
slopes.  
An interesting app showing the weather forecast (with animation) for the next 10 days for the Arctic region 
can be found at https://www.weather-forecast.com/maps/Arctic. Considered parameters are: temperature, 
cloud cover, wind, precipitation, rain and snow.  
The following site: http://nsidc.org/soac contains NASA satellite data displayed in the form of maps and bar 
charts. Data on Arctic change over time are explained and graphically displayed. Such data are related to: 
 Near surface air temperature 
 Water vapour 
 Sea ice 
 Snow cover 
 Vegetation 
 Frozen ground 
 Annual minimum exposed snow and ice 
 Sea ice age 
Finally, it is interesting to mention particular phenomena that can be seen sometimes in the Arctic areas due 
to those particular environmental conditions. The Aurora Polar phenomenon (distinguishing it in Boreal or 
Austral depending on the hemisphere in which it occurs, North or South) is produced by solar particles, mostly 
made of electrons, which are pushed against the Earth's magnetic field at great speed. Since the Earth's 
magnetic field is weaker at either pole, some particles enter the Earth's atmosphere and collide with gas 
particles, thus producing energy generating, in our eyes, waves of light of various wavelengths at different 
high (Blue to violet – below 100 km; Green 100 – 240 km; Red – over 240 km). 
Many Web sites provide very nice photographs about this phenomenon.  
See e.g.: https://oceanwide-expeditions.com/to-do/experiences/aurora-borealis-northern-light 
The description of several other phenomena, such as e.g. Coronas and anti-coronas, Halos, and Optical haze, 
can be seen at: https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/phenomena.html. 
2.3 Spatial distribution of Oil & Gas fields 
It is a fact that even today most of the Arctic areas (especially offshore) remain unexplored with respect to 
hydrocarbon resources. Currently, the increasing meltdown of summer polar ice in the Arctic Ocean 
encourages the Arctic nations to perform offshore hydrocarbon exploration activities. 
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Generally, the area north of the Arctic Circle can be subdivided into three parts:  
 1/3 of the area is covered by land, the so called Arctic region. 
 1/3 of the area is covered by shallow waters, the so called continental shelves. 
 1/3 of the area is covered by deep waters of the Arctic Ocean (over 500 meters deep). 
The Arctic region holds about 16% of the total Oil and Gas resources of the Arctic and until today is where 
most of the exploration activities have taken place. The Arctic continental shelves constitute the largest 
geographical area on Earth with enormous probable resources still unexplored. The Arctic Ocean remains also 
unexplored. Large Arctic oil and natural gas discoveries began in Russia in 1962, with the discovery of the 
Tazovskoye Field, followed in 1967 with the discovery of the US Alaskan Prudhoe Bay Field. 
In 2008, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) released the first-ever wide-ranging assessment of 
Arctic oil and gas resources, estimating that the area north of the Arctic Circle contains 22% of the world’s 
undiscovered but recoverable hydrocarbon reserves (30% of the gas and respectively 13% of the oil 
reserves). More than 87% of these resources are located in the following seven Arctic basins which are also 
illustrated in Figure 2.6: Amerasian, Arctic Alaska, East Barents, East Greenland Rift, West Greenland-East 
Canada, West Siberian, and Yenisey-Khatanga Basin. https://geology.com/articles/arctic-oil-and-gas/  
 
Figure 2 6 Map of Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Provinces (Source: Geology.com) 
According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS) assessment (2008) the estimated undiscovered but 
technically recoverable, conventional Oil & Gas resources in the aforementioned seven Arctic basins account 
for about 360 billion barrels of oil equivalent and their distribution is illustrated in Table 2.2. 
Further information: https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf  
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Table 2 2 Estimated Oil & Gas resources in the seven largest Petroleum Provinces of the Arctic (Source: U.S. Geological 
Survey, May 2008) 
 
The USGS assessment concludes that 412 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe) remain to be found in the 
Arctic out of which 84% are expected to occur offshore. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that USGS’s 
assessment didn’t take into consideration the economic feasibility for the exploration and exploitation of the 
estimated Arctic oil & gas resources. 
A distribution of the potential Arctic oil and gas resources among the Arctic countries is illustrated in Figure 
2.7. It could be deducted that Russia is estimated to hold more than half of the total Arctic hydrocarbon 
resources. However, U.S.A. appears to be the country with the largest undiscovered Arctic oil reserves which 
gather the most of the probabilities for a possible development. The potentials and the perspectives of 
hydrocarbon development for each Arctic country are analysed in the following report: 
http://www.safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/pdf/EY-Arctic_oil_and_gas.pdf    
 
Figure 2 7 Distribution of potential Arctic Oil & Gas Resources (Source: EY calculations from US DOE and US GS data, 
2013) 
2.4 Arctic continental shelf claims 
During the last decades, Arctic has been gradually evolving from a remote area to a strategic zone of global 
geopolitical relevance. The main reasons for the transformation of Arctic's geopolitical status are: 
 The opening of the Arctic shipping routes. The rise of the global temperature has as a consequence 
the continuous reduction of the average Arctic sea ice extent and eventually the establishment of 
new shipping routes through the Arctic Sea. Nowadays, the North - West Passage (NWP) through the 
Canadian Arctic Archipelago and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) which follows the Russian and 
 
Petroleum 
Province  
Crude Oil 
(billion barrels) 
Natural Gas  
(trillion cubic feet) 
Natural Gas Liquids  
(billion barrels) 
Total 
(billion barrels of oil 
equivalent) 
West Siberian Basin 3.66 651.50 20.33 132.57 
Arctic Alaska 29.96 221.40 5.90 72.77 
East Barents Basin 7.41 317.56 1.42 61.76 
East Greenland Rift 
Basin 
8.90 86.18 8.12 31.39 
Yenisey – Khatanga 
Basin 
5.58 99.96 2.68 24.92 
Amerasian Basin 9.72 56.89 0.54 19.75 
West Greenland – 
East Canada 
7.27 51.82 1.15 17.06 
Total 7 72.5 1,485.31 40.14 360.22 
Total Arctic 90 1,669 44 412 
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Norwegian coasts are accessible by conventional vessels only during the summer months. The year 
round opening of the Arctic Sea routes is expected to make Arctic Oil and Gas resources much more 
accessible and to reduce significantly their transportation costs. In Figure 2.7 the green dotted line 
marks the Northeast Passage or Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the blue dotted line marks the North - 
West Passage (NWP) respectively. 
 The high energy potential of the Arctic area. Recent assessments estimate that the area north of the 
Arctic Circle holds 22% of the Earth's undiscovered conventional Oil and Gas resources. 
 The advancement of the Arctic technology. The technological developments of the last decades have 
made possible to extract hydrocarbons from deep sea waters and under extreme weather conditions. 
Significant technological developments have been also identified in the oil spill detection & response 
techniques. As years go by, the production of offshore Arctic hydrocarbons is gradually becoming 
economically more viable.  
 Developments in the Arctic legal framework. The UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
which is in force since 1994 allows the Arctic states to claim for extension of the limits of their 
exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in the Arctic Ocean. 
Nowadays political tension in the Arctic is low. Arctic countries cooperate within the framework of 
international research programmes and several international institutions and non-state organizations were 
funded. Nevertheless, the opening of new shipping routes in the Arctic and the energy potential of the area 
are factors that could affect the geopolitical stability in the Arctic. A French expert on the Arctic, Richard 
Labévière, has outlined three alternative geopolitical scenarios in the area: 
1. An Arctic dominated by the United States. 
2. A new regional cold war between the United States and Russia. 
3. An Arctic space with stable partition of national sovereignty, respect for the Law of the Sea and 
strong cooperative institutions.  
An interesting geopolitical analysis of the Arctic area can be found here: 
http://site.uit.no/arcticreview/files/2015/01/Geopolitics-International-Governance.pdf  
The economic zone of every Arctic country in the Arctic Ocean is determined by the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). It must be underlined that up today, UNCLOS has been ratified by Russia, 
Norway, Denmark and Canada but not from U.S.A.  
The full document of UNCLOS can be found here: 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf  
According to UNCLOS, each country’s sovereign territorial waters extend to a maximum of 12 nautical miles 
(22 km). Every coastal country may establish an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles 
(370 km) from shore. UNCLOS allows States to extend their limits beyond 200 miles if they can provide 
scientific evidence that the continental shelf beyond their coastline extends that far. Upon ratification of 
UNCLOS, a country has a ten-year period to make claims to an extended continental shelf, by collecting and 
analysing data on the depth, shape, and geophysical characteristics of the seabed and sub-sea floor. If 
validated, the country receives exclusive rights to resources on or below the seabed of the relevant area. 
Norway, Russia, Canada, and Denmark have all conducted scientific projects to provide a basis for seabed 
claims on extended continental shelves beyond their exclusive economic zones, and have subsequently 
submitted claims to the UN Commission. As the US has not ratified UNCLOS, it cannot submit claims to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The CLCS review of the claims is expected to take 
years. It must be also added that the status of some territories in the Arctic sea region is disputed for various 
reasons.  
A very interesting review on Arctic continental shelf claims has been recently (2017) published by the 
European Parliamentary Research Service and can be found here: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/595870/EPRS_BRI(2017)595870_EN.pdf  
In 2008 the five Arctic coastal countries - Russia, Denmark, Norway, Canada and U.S.A., issued the so called 
Ilulissat Declaration which actually delimits national claims in the Arctic Ocean. More specifically, the Arctic 
Five through the Ilulissat Declaration have stated that jurisdiction and territorial claims should be solved by 
negotiations within the existing international legal framework (UNCLOS) and therefore there is no need to 
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develop a new comprehensive international legal scheme to govern the Arctic Ocean. The document of the 
Ilulissat Declaration can be found here: 
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/080525_arctic_ocean_conference-_outcome.pdf  
In Figure 2.8 a map of the Arctic territorial claims is illustrated. With the red line, the exclusive economic 
zones of each Arctic country are delimited. In 2001, Russia became the first country to file a claim, arguing 
that the underwater Lomonosov ridge was not merely a chain of mountains in international waters but was 
actually an extension of Siberia’s continental shelf. Russia's claim is illustrated in Figure 2.7 with the orange 
area in the Arctic Ocean beyond the red line. It must also be stated that the UN Commission was not 
convinced and asked for seismology reports and sonar measurements to support Russia’s submission. 
 
Figure 2 8 Map of Arctic Territorial Claims (Source: National Defense University Press) 
 
2.4.1 Arctic Territorial or Maritime Disputes which have been resolved 
United States - Canada 
A long dispute between United States and Canada concerned the Northwest Passage. The USA claimed that it 
was international waters, whereas Canada considered it as Canadian, internal waters. The US and Canada had 
long disagreed on who had jurisdiction over the Northwest Passage, which is really a collection of routes 
navigating around the islands of the Canadian Arctic between Alaska and Greenland (Figure 2.8). In 1988, the 
two countries agreed that the US would always ask permission before sending icebreakers through the 
Northwest Passage, and the Canadians would always give it.  
Further information: https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-09-04/who-controls-northwest-passage-its-debate  
Norway - Russia 
The Barents Sea controversy was a dispute between Norway and Russia, officially started in 1974 over the 
delimitation of Arctic sea boundaries in the Barents Sea. The conflict is historically characterised by both 
nations continuously presenting claims on the seabed, none of which are officially acknowledged or legally 
justified. The first known claims were presented by Norway in 1963 after which Russia followed suit in 1965. 
The Barents Sea dispute officially came to an end on 7th June 2011, the date on which the Barents Sea 
Treaty, signed on 15th September 2010, came into action after almost 40 years of negotiations.  
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Further information: http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/758/3/the-barents-sea-conflict-russia-and-
norway-competing-over-fossil-fuel-riches-in-the-arctic  
United States - Russia  
Since the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1863, the United States and Russia have been trying to finalize 
marine boundaries. The most recent attempt was made in 1990 and became known as the Baker-
Shevardnadze Treaty. With the fall of Soviet Union, the Russian Parliament refused to ratify the Treaty and 
Russian diplomats from time to time attempted to re-negotiate some of the agreements made in 1990. The 
Russian argument was largely based on the fact that Shevardnadze was not acting on behalf of the Country’s 
interests. According to some experts, Russia cannot legally undermine the 1990 Treaty, even if it refuses to 
ratify it. 
 
2.4.2 Arctic Territorial or Maritime Disputes which remain unresolved 
Canada - Denmark  
Far in the Arctic North lies the uninhabited, barren and desolate Hans Island. Since the early 1930s, Hans 
Island has been at the centre of an ongoing disagreement between Canada and Denmark as technically it is 
located in both Danish and Canadian waters. Currently, Canada and Denmark agree to disagree on who owns 
Hans Island. There have been talks and willingness to solve the hurdle, but nothing has been agreed so far. 
The militaries of both Countries periodically visit the island to remove the other Country’s flag and leave a 
bottle of Danish schnapps or Canadian whisky. 
Further information: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/canada-denmark-should-turn-hans-island-into-a-
condominium-academics-1.3315640    
Russia - Canada - Denmark  
Russia, Denmark and Canada all are claiming that Lomonosov ridge is a continuation of their continental 
shelf, therefore allowing them to proclaim sovereignty over it and additional 200 miles adjacent to it. 
Denmark is using Greenland to proclaim that Lomonosov ridge is a natural continuation of the world’s largest 
island. Canada has a slightly different point of view, stating that the massive ridge is part of North American 
continent. Russia, arguably spending the most time and money to conduct scientific research on the subject 
had launched several expeditions, including to the bottom of the Arctic Ocean right under the North Pole. 
Russia claims that Lomonosov Ridge is a continuation of Siberia (Northern Asia). 
Further information: https://arctic.ru/analitic/20181115/804847.html  
Russian Claims on the Arctic Continental Shelf 
According to the UNCLOS, a coastal state has exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural 
resources of its continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles from its shores. Beyond this limit, a coastal state 
has to provide scientific evidence to establish the extent of the legally defined continental shelf.  
In its 2001 claim, Russia argued that the Lomonosov Ridge and the Alpha Mendeleev Ridge are both 
geological extensions of its continental Siberian shelf and, thus, that parts of the Central Arctic Ocean, as well 
as parts of the Barents Sea, the Bering Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk, fall under its jurisdiction.  
However, the CLCS found the substantiation of the Russian claim on the shelf insufficient and asked for more 
information. Since then a new submission has been under preparation. 
International experts suggest several scenarios for the further developments if a second, revised submission 
be returned to the CLCS. One extreme would be for Moscow to withdraw from the UNCLOS and just declare 
unilaterally that its continental shelf reaches up to the North Pole. Russia would still retain the right to a 
continental shelf, and would find itself in the same position as the U.S., which remains outside the UNCLOS, 
and would have to rely on customary law to support its claim. However, this option is hardly acceptable for 
Moscow because it would provide a much less secure legal position than would a CLCS’ decision which is 
considered as a final and binding rule. 
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2.5 Drilling activities 
Drilling activities in the Arctic Basins started in the seventies. A map giving an idea about the location of such 
activities can be found at: http://2knowabout.blogspot.it/2014/12/shells-arctic-challenger-to-burn-oil.html  
The map in Figure 2.9 shows another distribution of the oil and gas production wells (purple points) in the 
Arctic and Sub-Arctic areas until 2014. It can be seen that there are offshore production wells in the Beaufort 
Sea, in the north part the Canadian Archipelago, in the Barents Sea and in the Kara Sea. The North West 
Passage and the Northern Sea Route are also illustrated along with the military presence in the Arctic area. 
This map can be found at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/22/arctic-ice-melting-oil-drilling  
The same map, with higher resolution, can be found at:  
http://www.arcgis.com/home/webmap/viewer.html?url=https://services.arcgis.com/hRUr1F8lE8Jq2uJo/ArcGIS/re
st/services/OpeningUpTheNorth/FeatureServer/2&source=sd  
A very interesting report - dealing with the petroleum hydrocarbon issue in the Arctic area can be found at:  
https://www.amap.no/documents/download/76  
An interesting poster (from INTERSEA) providing the spatial distribution of oil and gas platforms operating in 
the Arctic Circle until 2014, along with their characteristics, can be found at:  
https://www.offshore-mag.com/content/dam/offshore/print-articles/volume-74/02/0214ArcticPoster-
012014Ads.pdf  
According to the above source, all Arctic production facilities and terminals until January 2014 were in total 
34. 
The above poster has been extracted from a set of various maps, which may be of interest to readers, 
accessible from: https://www.offshore-mag.com/maps-posters.html  
 
Figure 2 9 Map of oil and gas production wells in Arctic and Sub-Arctic areas (Source: Philippe Rekacewicz, Le monde 
Diplomatique) 
The main challenges in the Arctic offshore development, from high costs to high environmental risk, are 
described in the report “Arctic oil and gas” (2013) prepared by EY. It is worth reporting EY’s perspective on this 
important issue. “There is huge potential as well as risks associated with operations in the Arctic and the 
industry must prove that the Arctic can be drilled and developed safely. These operations are clearly on the 
outer limits of the both safety and commercial viability for the industry and a spill or accident there would be 
catastrophic (….). Geopolitics will play a critical role, as countries with varying interests use control through 
jurisdiction and regulation as opposed to diplomatic cooperation. In such a political environment, the massive 
long-term investments and commitments that will be required to develop these resources are unlikely to be 
forthcoming, or at least more limited. On a more positive note, commercial collaboration and competition, 
primarily based on the technology and resources of the major players in the Arctic (such as ExxonMobil, Shell, 
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BP, Statoil, Eni, Total SA, Chevron and ConocoPhillips), along with the Russian giants Rosneft and Gazprom and 
possibly a few of the larger independents, will truly lead us to pioneer this frontier”.  
Further information: https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/pdf/EY-Arctic_oil_and_gas.pdf.  
The RIAC (Russian International Affair Council) web site describes the current and future perspectives for oil 
and gas resource development in five countries: Russia, Canada, Denmark, Norway and the United States, 
analyses main issues oil and gas companies face while assembling their projects as well as factors that 
influence their activity. Further information: http://russiancouncil.ru/en/arcticoil  
The Offshore Energy Today web site dedicated to the Arctic contains continuously up-to-date information of 
various types: https://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/tag/arctic/    
2.6 Costs of oil production in the Arctic Seas 
The convenience of drilling in the Arctic Seas even today remains an issue under discussion as offshore 
operations in Arctic still remain costly and risky. 
2.6.1 Factors that shape the prices of Arctic oil production 
Despite the fact that most of the fields in Arctic were discovered in the 1970s and early 1980s, little 
development activity has been reported to date. The Arctic remains the most expensive region on Earth for 
resource exploration and development for a number of reasons: 
 Extreme weather conditions - Installations, equipment and ships must be specially designed to 
withstand the extremely rigid temperatures. 
 Remoteness - Transportation of materials and equipment is extremely expensive. The icepack can 
hinder shipment of personnel, materials, equipment, and oil for long time periods. Furthermore, long 
supply lines from the world’s manufacturing centres require equipment redundancy and a larger 
inventory of spare parts to insure reliability.  
 High operational costs - Higher wages and salaries are required to induce highly qualified personnel 
to work in the isolated and inhospitable Arctic. 
 Environmental regulations - Following the Deep Water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, 
regulations on offshore drilling have been tightened, thereby limiting access and increasing costs 
further. 
In Figure 2.10 the Global Liquids Cost Curve is illustrated according to Rystad Energy (2014). It is estimated 
that in 2020 the total world oil production will be around 100 million barrels per day to cover the global oil 
demand. The diagram illustrates every possible resource of oil with an upper and a lower production cost 
depending on several parameters. For this reason, an average break-even price is introduced for every 
resource of oil. From the Global Liquid Cost Curve it can be deducted that in 2020 Arctic oil production will 
remain the most expensive and will have the smallest contribution to the total oil production. It must be 
underlined that offshore Arctic oil production is more expensive than onshore and as a consequence the 
corresponding average break – even price must be above 78 $/bbl. 
2.6.2 Market conditions 
The relatively low prices that dominated the oil market the last years combined with other sources of supply 
that have appeared in the market, resulted in the postponement of large-scale, Arctic oil exploration and 
production to the future years. New extraction technologies for deep water drilling, secondary, and tertiary oil 
production along with Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) methods, which allow the extraction of unconventional oil 
reserves (oil from tar sands, tight oil, shale oil) have increased global potentials for oil production. From the 
other hand, the global decrease in the economic growth and the increase of renewable energy share in the 
global energy mix has decreased oil demand.  
However, since Arctic holds approximately 22% of the world’s undiscovered, conventional oil and gas 
resources from which only 16% is believed to be found on land, it is expected that offshore oil and gas 
production activity in the Arctic will be developed in the next decades. According to Figure 2.10 offshore Arctic 
oil extraction will be boosted when reserves of cheap oil get depleted and oil prices arise above 80 $/bbl.   
 
 19 
 
Figure 2 10 Global Liquids Cost Curve (Source: Rystad Energy, 2014) 
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3 Winterisation standards 
Winterization is a process for ensuring that a system (i.e. equipment, installations or vessels) is suitable for 
working in cold climate conditions.  Winterization includes e.g. mitigation of ice effects, prevention of ice 
accretion, de-icing, protection of operating conditions, piping arrangements, etc. 
Therefore, each vessel and installation working in the Arctic environment must be properly winterized or at 
least accomplish with the minimum requirements for all vessel types as established by norms and standards.  
According to DNVGL-OS-A201 offshore standards “Winterization for cold climate operations” (see ed. July 
2015 at: https://www.dnvgl.com/rules-standards/index.html) three different levels of winterization are 
considered, depending on the minimum temperature the structure will have to endeavour: 
 A basic winterization should ensure the structure to withstand air temperature not below -15°C and 
water temperature of +4°C without ice class and -2°C with ice class; 
 A cold winterization should ensure the structure to withstand air temperature not below -30°C and 
water temperature of +2°C without ice class and -2°C with ice class; 
 A polar winterization should ensure a resistance down to -45°C with water never above -2°C.  
To ensure a proper customized design and winterization to those installations planned to work in harsh 
climates, DNVGL proposed a set of rules and standards for managing the potential deterioration in 
functionality of equipment, installations and vessels as a result of cold climate operations. These rules and 
standards are described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
3.1 DNV GL rules for mobile offshore units 
 DNVGL-RU-OU-0101 Offshore drilling and support units 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/dnvgl/ru-ou/2015-07/DNVGL-RU-OU-0101.pdf  
This publication presents DNV GL’s Rules for Classification of Offshore Drilling and Support Units, the terms 
and procedures for assigning and maintaining classification, including listing of the applicable technical 
references to be applied for classification. 
 DNVGL-RU-OU-0102 Floating production, storage and loading units 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/dnvgl/ru-ou/2015-07/DNVGL-RU-OU-0102.pdf  
This publication presents DNV GL's Rules for Classification of Floating Production and Storage Units or 
Installations, stating the terms and procedures for assigning and maintaining classification, including listing of 
the applicable technical references to be applied for classification. 
 DNVGL-RU-OU-0103 Floating LNG/LPG production, storage and loading units 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/dnvgl/ru-ou/2015-07/DNVGL-RU-OU-0103.pdf  
Although this document refers primarily to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), 
the principles herein may also be used for other offshore gas installations such as those involving primarily 
Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), and Gas To Liquid (GTL) products. A floating offshore installation which 
processes hydrocarbons and refrigerates gas to produce LNG will be termed here an LNG FPSO (LNG Floating 
Production, Storage and Offloading unit). LNG FPSOs are also commonly termed FLNG. An offshore 
installation which receives and degasifies LNG is termed an FSRU (Floating Storage and Regasification Unit). 
 DNVGL-RU-OU-0104 Self-elevating units 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/dnvgl/ru-ou/2015-07/DNVGL-RU-OU-0104.pdf  
The objective of this publication is to give a complete but concise overview of the relevant technical standards 
and DNV GL’s involvement for building and classing a conventional self-elevating unit. In this objective, the 
book is to be used in conjunction with DNV GL-RU-OU-0101 and the relevant technical standards as referred 
to therein. 
This publication covers the involvement of class for a unit’s different phases during life time, i.e. design, 
construction, commissioning, delivery and operation. The publication does not cover the requirements for 
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separate additional class notations, or the requirements for units of an unconventional design. These are 
detailed in the Rules for drilling units (ref. DNVGL-RU-OU-0101). This publication does not cover the 
requirements applicable for units drilling on a fixed platform. 
3.2 DNV GL offshore Arctic standards 
 DNVGL-OS-A101 Safety principals and arrangements 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/dnvgl/OS/2015-07/DNVGL-OS-A101.pdf 
The objectives of these standards are to: 
• provide an internationally acceptable standard of safety for offshore units and installations 
by defining requirements for design loads, arrangements, area classification, shut down 
logic, alarms, escape ways and communication; 
• serve as a contractual reference document between suppliers and purchasers; 
• serve as a guideline for designers, suppliers, purchasers and regulators; 
• specify procedures and requirements for units or installations subject to DNV GL certification 
and classification services. 
 
 DNVGL-OS-B101 Metallic materials 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/dnvgl/OS/2015-07/DNVGL-OS-B101.pdf 
 
• A material specification shall be prepared referring to the relevant section of this standard 
and stating possible additional requirements and/or modifications to materials, manufacture 
and testing. 
• The specified properties shall be consistent with the specific application and operational 
requirements of the structure or equipment. Suitable allowances shall be included for 
possible degradation of the mechanical properties resulting from subsequent fabrication 
and installation activities. 
• The specification should include specific requirements in places where this standard gives 
options, e.g. chemical composition, testing, requirements subject to agreement, etc.  
 
 DNVGL-OS-C101 Design of offshore steel structures 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/dnvgl/os/2015-07/DNVGL-OS-C101.pdf 
 
• DNVGL-OS-C101 is the general part of the DNV GL Offshore Standards for structures. The 
design principles and overall requirements are defined in this standard. The standard is 
primarily intended to be used in design of a structure where a supporting object standard 
exists, but may also be used as a stand-alone document for objects where no object 
standard exist. 
• When designing a unit where an object standard exists, the object standard (DNVGL-OS-
C10x) for the specific type of unit shall be applied. The object standard gives references to 
this standard when appropriate. 
• In case of deviating requirements between this standard and the object standard, 
requirements of this standard shall be overruled by specific requirements given in the object 
standard. 
• This standard has been written for general world-wide application. Governmental regulations 
may include requirements in excess of the provisions by this standard depending on size, 
type, location and intended service of the offshore unit or installation 
 
 DNVGL-OS-C301 Stability and watertight integrity 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/DNVGL/OS/2017-01/DNVGL-OS-C301.pdf 
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This offshore standard provides principles, technical requirements and guidance related to stability, 
watertight integrity, freeboard and weathertight closing appliances for mobile offshore units and 
floating offshore installations. 
The types of units that are covered by this standard include: 
• ship shaped units 
• column stabilised units 
• self-elevating units 
• cylindrical units 
• tension leg units 
• Deep draught units 
The objectives of this standard are to: 
• provide an internationally acceptable standard of safety by defining minimum requirements 
for stability, watertight integrity, freeboard and weathertight closing appliances 
• serve as a contractual reference document between suppliers and purchasers 
• serve as a guideline for designers, suppliers, purchasers and regulators 
• specify procedures and requirements for units or installations subject to DNV GL certification 
and classification. 
 
 DNVGL-OS-D101 Marine and machinery systems and equipment 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/dnvgl/OS/2015-07/DNVGL-OS-D101.pdf 
The requirements in this standard cover marine piping systems, machinery piping systems and 
marine machinery systems, which are defined as systems serving the marine systems on an offshore 
unit or installation and not primarily intended for operation in drilling or hydrocarbon production 
service or dedicated auxiliary systems. Interfaces between such systems and marine systems should 
be identified and a specification break defined. 
 
 DNVGL-OS-D201 Electrical installations (2017) 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/DNVGL/OS/2017-01/DNVGL-OS-D201.pdf 
The objectives of this standard are to: 
• provide an internationally acceptable standard of safety by defining minimum requirements 
for offshore electrical installations 
• serve as a contractual reference document between suppliers and purchasers serve as a 
guideline for designers, suppliers, purchasers and regulators 
• specify procedures and requirements for offshore units or installations subject to DNV GL 
certification and classification 
 DNVGL-OS-D202 Automation, safety, and telecommunication systems 
http://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/dnvgl/OS/2015-07/DNVGL-OS-D202.pdf 
The requirements of this standard, shall apply to all safety, automation, and telecommunication 
systems required by the DNV GL Offshore Standards. 
All safety, automation, and telecommunication systems installed, but not necessarily required by the 
DNV GL Offshore Standards, that may have an impact on the safety of main functions (see DNVGL-
OS-A101), shall meet the requirements of this standard. 
The requirements of this standard are considered to meet the regulations of the MODU Code, with 
regard to safety, automation, and telecommunication systems. 
 
 DNVGL-OS-D301 Fire protection 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/dnvgl/OS/2015-07/DNVGL-OS-D301.pdf 
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This standard is applicable to drilling/well intervention, storage, production, accommodation and other 
types of mobile units and offshore installations. 
The standard covers the following systems and arrangements, including relevant equipment and 
structures: 
• passive fire protection 
• active fire protection of specific areas 
• fire-fighting systems 
• fire and gas detection and alarm systems 
• miscellaneous items 
 
 DNVGL-OS-E101 Drilling facilities (2018) 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/DNVGL/OS/2018-01/DNVGL-OS-E101.pdf 
The standard covers drilling systems and equipment located both surface and subsea, including 
wellhead connectors, but not wellhead or elements located below wellhead. 
The prescriptive requirements in the standard are the results of generic hazard identification and 
barrier analysis based on existing technology and operations. 
Prescriptive requirements are not intended to inhibit the development and application of new 
technology and operations, and available technological and technical improvements at the time of 
application should be taken into account. 
Introduction of novel technology or designs shall be preceded by a recognized qualification process. 
Alternative solutions, if clearly proven to provide an equivalent or higher safety level than required in 
this standard, may be considered to comply with this standard. 
 
 DNVGL-OS-E201 Oil and gas processing systems 
http://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/dnvgl/OS/2015-07/DNVGL-OS-E201.pdf 
This offshore standard contains criteria, technical requirements and guidance on design, construction 
and commissioning of offshore hydrocarbon production plants and associated equipment. The 
standard also covers liquefaction of natural gas and regasification of liquefied natural gas and also 
associated gas processing. 
The standard is applicable to plants located on floating offshore units and on fixed offshore 
structures of various types. Offshore installations include fixed and floating terminals for export or 
import of LNG 
 
 DNVGL-OS-E301 Position mooring 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/dnvgl/os/2015-07/DNVGL-OS-E301.pdf 
The standard is applicable for and limited to column-stabilised units, ship-shaped units single point 
moorings, loading buoys and deep draught floaters (DDF) or other floating bodies relying on catenary 
mooring, semi-taut and taut leg mooring system. The standard is also applicable for soft yoke 
systems. The objective shall give a uniform level of safety for mooring systems, consisting of chain, 
steel wire ropes and fiber ropes. 
The standard has been written in order to: 
• give a uniform level of safety for mooring systems 
• serve as a reference document in contractual matters between purchaser and contractor 
• serve as a guideline for designers, purchasers and contractors 
• specify procedures and requirements for mooring systems subject to DNV GL certification 
and classification services 
 
 DNVGL-OS-E401 Helicopter decks (2017) 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/DNVGL/OS/2017-01/DNVGL-OS-E401.pdf 
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This standard is intended to provide requirements and guidance to the design of helicopter decks 
constructed in steel or aluminium, for mobile offshore units and offshore installations. 
 
The objectives of this standard shall: 
 
• provide an internationally acceptable standard of safety for helicopter decks by defining 
minimum requirements for the design, materials and construction 
• serve as a contractual reference document 
• serve as a guideline for designers, suppliers, purchasers, contractors and regulators 
• specify procedures and requirements for helicopter decks subject to DNV GL certification and 
classification. 
 
3.3 Anti-icing and anti-freezing measures 
These measures are required for exposed areas, systems and equipment. The following are examples of 
generally suitable solutions: 
 Equipment and areas that require anti-icing measures should, as far as possible, be situated in 
protected locations, so that sea spray and weather cannot reach them. A shielded location will 
normally be the simplest and most reliable solution for anti-icing, wherever it is possible. However, 
this implies the increase of energy consumption due to the installation’s heating-ventilation and air 
conditioning (HVAC) systems. Moreover, congestion of equipment increases the damages in case of 
(confined) explosion; hence specific ATEX design and passive blast protections solutions (explosion 
proof walls, explosion hatches, etc.) are to be considered. 
 Hard removable covers may also be applicable for some types of equipment.  
 The use of electric heating blankets or heat tracing can be a solution for the protection of equipment 
on open decks or unheated spaces. 
 The use of anti-freeze additives or use of low temperature fluids in liquid systems alone or in 
combination with supplementary heating of either the piping or the circulating fluid. 
Anti-freezing arrangements using heating should be able to maintain the subject liquid to at least +3°C above 
its nominal freezing temperature and the heating capacity for anti-icing arrangements shall be sufficient to 
prevent surface ice forming. Anti-icing arrangements using heating should be able to maintain a surface 
temperature of at least +3°C. The heating capacity should be established by a heat balance calculation and 
should be maintained at a range from +3°C to +10°C in order to minimize the potential effect of corrosion 
under the insulation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deicing 
Anti-icing of offshore structures can be accomplished by applying a protective layer, using a viscous fluid 
called anti-ice fluid, over a surface to absorb the contaminant. All anti-ice fluids offer only limited protection, 
dependent upon frozen contaminant type and prevailing weather conditions. A fluid has failed when it no 
longer can absorb the contaminant and it essentially becomes a contaminant itself. Even water can be a 
contaminant in this sense, as it dilutes the anti-icing agent until it is no longer effective. 
3.4 De-icing measures 
De-icing must be carried out by fixed heating arrangements or by use of portable equipment such as: 
 High pressure blowing steam hoses and hot water hoses: The location and number of the steam/hot 
water outlets and equipment shall be appropriate to the local layout and to the time scale in which 
the de-icing is required to be achieved. 
 Mallets (wooden, rubber or plastic hammers) shovels and hand held tools: De-icing equipment shall 
be located in areas where it is readily available and shall be protected from icing and other adverse 
conditions. 
Chemical de-icing fluids: consisting of propylene glycol (PG) and additives applied on metallic structures. 
However, since most of the de-icing fluid does not adhere to the structure surfaces, and falls to the ground or 
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into the sea, operators typically use containment systems to capture the used liquid, so that it cannot seep 
into the ground and water. Even though PG is classified as non-toxic, it pollutes waterways since it consumes 
large amounts of oxygen as it decomposes, causing aquatic life to suffocate 
Several types of chemical de-icers are available on the market, although they share a common working 
mechanism: they prevent water molecules from binding above a certain temperature that depends on the 
concentration. This temperature is below 0 °C, the freezing point of pure water. Sometimes, there is an 
exothermic dissolution reaction that allows for an even stronger melting power 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deicing). 
Some examples of chemical de-icers can be: 
Inorganic salts such as: 
 Sodium chloride (NaCl or table salt; the most common chemical de-icing); 
 Magnesium chloride (MgCl2, often added to salt to lower its working temperature); 
 Calcium chloride (CaCl2, often added to salt to lower its working temperature); 
 Potassium chloride (KCl). 
Organic compounds such as: 
 Calcium magnesium acetate (CaMg2(CH3COO)6); 
 Potassium acetate (CH3COOK); 
 Potassium formate (CHO2K); 
 Sodium formate (HCOONa); 
 Calcium formate (Ca(HCOO)2); 
 Urea (CO(NH2)2), a common fertilizer. 
Alcohols, diols and polyols such as: 
 Methanol (CH4O); 
 Ethylene glycol (C2H6O2); 
 Propylene glycol (C3H8O2); 
 Glycerol (C3H8O3). 
Such chemical methods can be quite impacting on the Arctic environment. In fact, the chemicals could also 
reach water bodies in concentrations that are toxic to the ecosystems.  
Organic compounds are biodegraded and may cause oxygen-depletion issues. Small creeks and ponds with 
long turnover time are especially vulnerable. 
Ethylene glycol and propylene glycol are known to exert high levels of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) 
during degradation in surface waters. This process can adversely affect aquatic life by consuming oxygen 
needed by aquatic organisms for survival. Large quantities of dissolved oxygen (DO) in the water column are 
consumed when microbial populations decompose propylene glycol. 
Sufficient dissolved oxygen levels in surface waters are critical for the survival of fish, macroinvertebrates, 
and other aquatic organisms. If oxygen concentrations drop below a minimum level, organisms emigrate, if 
able and possible, to areas with higher oxygen levels or eventually die. This effect can drastically reduce the 
amount of usable aquatic habitat. 
Reductions in DO levels can reduce or eliminate bottom feeder populations, create conditions that favour a 
change in a community’s species profile, or alter critical food-web interactions. 
Direct infrared heating has also been developed as de-icing technique. This heat transfer mechanism is 
substantially faster than conventional heat transfer modes used by conventional de-icing (convection and 
conduction) due to the cooling effect of the air on the de-icing fluid spray. One infrared de-icing system 
requires that the heating process take place inside a specially-constructed installation. This system has had 
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limited interest among Operators, due to the space and related logistical requirements for the enclosed 
location (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deicing). 
3.5 Selection of metallic material 
All metallic materials used in structure, equipment or systems considered important for safety or otherwise 
addressed in DNVGL-OS-A201 standard, and located in open or unheated spaces, shall have mechanical 
properties appropriate for the winterization temperatures (WT).                               
The methodology for the selection of the metallic materials shall be consistent with the design code applied 
for the item under consideration. Design codes with material selection based on the extreme low temperature 
methodology (typically pressure vessels, drilling equipment, etc.) should apply WT as appropriate. 
Aluminium and Austenitic Stainless Steels are considered suitable to all levels of winterization, without need 
for further demonstration as shown at the following link: 
https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/DNV/codes/docs/2013-10/OS-A201.pdf. 
3.6 Selection of non-metallic material and electronic components 
All non-metallic materials (polymers, seals, ceramics, flexible hoses, fenders, etc.) and electronic components 
used in equipment/systems and located in open or unheated spaces shall function normally in cold-climate 
conditions. Therefore, they shall be confirmed to retain their relevant functional properties to ambient air 
temperature.  
Further information: https://rules.dnvgl.com/docs/pdf/DNV/codes/docs/2013-10/OS-A201.pdf. 
3.7 Other technical issues and solutions 
Throughout personal discussion with Operators, other technical issues and solutions to be adopted in extreme 
weather (also in sub-arctic areas) are hereafter highlighted: 
High winds and waves    
DNV-GL states that the mechanisms of rogue waves and their detailed dynamic properties are becoming 
clearer with recent research and through a growing consistency between numerical models and the 
experimental data documented by many studies. Several different mechanisms may be responsible for 
generating these waves such as linear focusing of energy, wave-current interactions (e.g. observed in the 
Agulhas current alongside the southeast coast of South Africa), crossing seas (Wind Sea and swell or two 
swell systems), quasi-resonant nonlinear interactions (modulation instability), shallow water effects and wind. 
Several rogue wave-related accidents involving ships and offshore structures have been reported, and yet, as 
of today, rogue waves are not explicitly included in classification society rules and offshore standards. This is 
understandable, due to a lack of consensus on the precise definition of rogue waves. Without a specific 
definition, there is also no agreement either on the probability of occurrence of such waves, being still a 
subject of research. More information on rogue waves can be found at:  https://www.dnvgl.com/feature/rogue-
waves.html#start. 
On a jack-up rig, the legs are extremely exposed, and need to withstand relatively high impacts. Therefore the 
design must take high wind and spray into account in accordance, for instance to the DNV GL standard for 
impact resistance which stipulates 14/11 MJ. 
Due to possible high waves, the jack-up leg length needs to increase up to over 100 m (some rigs reach over 
200 m high), as it needs to be possible to jack up the structure to a very significant air gap to keep the hull 
out of the way of slamming impact by extreme waves.  
Storage capabilities 
Due to the remoteness of the Arctic environments, large quantities of spares and consumables will require 
storage, as such items cannot be easily sourced in a remote area with limited infrastructure. This can either 
add to the requirements for sizing of the unit, but could also add to the congestion issue. Alternative storage 
options may have to be explored by the operator. 
Waste storage capabilities 
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Storage of waste products in remote and environmentally sensitive regions, waiting for the supply vessel to 
take care of them, must be carefully taken into account. Therefore, a complete “zero discharge” philosophy 
should be adopted, even for low risk disposal (such as cleaned cuttings with no oily residue), which may 
require processing and storage either on board or on a “floating shore base”. 
DNV-GL states that waste management is still far from being considered a mission accomplished. Key issues 
include: 
 The lack of adequate Reception Facilities in many ports and terminals. 
 Difficulties in the handling of certain hazardous waste streams. 
 The shortage of storage means on board. 
 The rather slack use of shipboard treatment technology. 
 The different priorities given by some port states to the disposal of some types of garbage. 
It is now clear that the Garbage Management Plans developed according to the IMO Guidelines MEPC.220 (63) 
need to address additional procedures and/or kinds of waste that fall into the operational or domestic origin 
categories and respond to new challenges or real situations. A few questions that still need answers are: 
 Can food waste be incinerated, where it is not permitted to be discharged into the sea and its long 
storage on board might create health hazards to the crew? 
 What kinds of waste should not be mixed and remain separated till their final disposal, to prevent 
risks to the seafarers and environmental damage by the dispersal of hazardous substances? 
 How can the minimum waste storage capacity of the ship be better calculated? 
 Is biological waste originated by various cleaning machinery considered as garbage? 
 How to deal with empty containers that initially held a hazardous substance? 
Environmentally-sound management of ship-generated garbage means taking all practicable steps to ensure 
that all potential waste streams are managed in a manner that will ensure the protection of human health 
and the environment against any adverse effects. 
An integrated approach with the Garbage Management Plan is considered necessary to help promote 
pragmatic garbage management and allow for capacity or resources to be optimized and fully utilized. It 
should be noted that a well implemented waste management plan is also dependent on the interaction 
between the vessel and a number of external factors such as ship suppliers, operators of reception facilities, 
port authorities, etc. Further information can be found at this link: 
https://www.dnvgl.com/news/the-challenge-of-optimizing-onboard-waste-management-56507  
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4 Pollution in the Arctic environment from offshore Oil & Gas activities 
The Arctic ecosystem equilibrium is both perfect and extremely vulnerable. It is perfect because of its extreme 
wilderness and almost complete lack of human interference; it is vulnerable because the minimum 
interference from outside may cause a great disturbance with negative effects that can last years or even 
centuries. 
These conditions are likely to change very rapidly as the formal economy of the Arctic is largely based on 
resource extraction. The Arctic area could contain as much as 22 percent of the world's hydrocarbon deposits, 
with some 29 billion barrels of oil and more than 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas thought to lie off the 
Alaska coast alone. North America's largest oil field, Prudhoe Bay, in comparison, holds an estimated 25 
billion barrels. 
Future development is expected to attract approximately a trillion dollars of new investment during the next 
25 years. The current trend of development in the Arctic is a shift from sporadic development to larger-scale 
development, including new infrastructure, a trend fed both by climate change and global demand for 
resources. Further information:  
http://wwf-ap.org/apps/site/templates/downloads/wwf-arctic-council-conservation-scorecard-WEB.pdf 
Until recently the abovementioned offshore deposits have been locked up by thick Arctic ice that no drill rig 
could withstand. But with the Arctic Ocean now projected to be ice-free during the summer by mid-century 
and the price of oil stabilizing at about $100 a barrel, nearly every Arctic nation is prospecting for black gold 
in its rapidly warming Arctic waters. Further information: 
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/09/120910-shell-begins-arctic-drilling/ 
Growing exploitation of the Arctic involves, nevertheless, major environmental risks. 
A report released by the National Research Council (NRC) has taken a comprehensive look at the impact of oil 
and gas exploration in the Arctic. According to NRC, rapid climate change is leading to retreat and thinning of 
Arctic sea ice, potentially increasing the accessibility of U.S. Arctic marine waters for commercial activities. 
With this projected rise in activity come additional concerns about the risk of oil spills. Recent interest in 
developing the rich oil and gas resources in federal waters offshore of Alaska has led to planning, 
environmental assessments, and preliminary drilling for oil and gas exploration. Further information:  
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/04/140423-national-research-council-on-oil-spills-in-
arctic/ 
In October 2016, the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has released an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to 
describe the effects of offshore oil and gas exploration activities in the U.S. Beaufort and Chukchi seas, 
Alaska. Given the widespread presence of several species of marine mammals in the above mentioned areas, 
it is likely that some amounts of seismic and exploratory drilling activities will result in the disturbance of 
marine mammals through sound, discharge of pollutants, and/or the physical presence of vessels. Further 
information: 
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/resource/document/effects-oil-and-gas-activities-arctic-ocean-final-
environmental-impact 
Yet, researchers don’t know how vulnerable Arctic species would be to a spill, and which species would be 
affected more than others. Due to lack of sufficient data on the number of species in the region as well as 
that on migratory population, it is difficult to predict future scenarios in case of an accident: depending on the 
extent of the spill and the ecosystem in the nearing areas, a spill can lead to anything from an unfortunate 
incident to a terrible disaster. Further information: 
http://blog.iiasa.ac.at/2017/08/16/what-would-an-oil-spill-mean-for-the-arctic/ 
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A research published on American journal Environmental Science and Technology shows that an oil spill – in 
this case in the winter – can have more serious consequences for food chains in the Arctic than previously 
assumed: “the most surprising finding is that it takes a lot less of the toxic substance pyrene from crude oil to 
kill zooplankton than we have seen in previous experiments. At doses 300 times smaller than what we have 
seen so far, half of the copepod species Calanus  glacialis in our experiment died,” says PhD Kirstine Toxværd 
(Impact of Pyrene Exposure during Overwintering of the Arctic Copepod Calanus glacialis). Further information: 
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.8b03327   
Generally speaking, the Arctic environment is more vulnerable to oil spills than warmer environments because 
oil breaks down more slowly under cold conditions and because Arctic plants and animals need a longer time 
to recover from damage. In addition, remedial measures are difficult due to the extreme conditions of cold, 
ice cover, and winter darkness. 
Knowledge of ice thickness, concentration, and extent is essential for anticipating the likely behaviour of oil in, 
under, and on ice and determining applicable response strategies, while high-quality bathymetry, nautical 
charting, and shoreline mapping data are needed for marine traffic management and oil spill response. From 
a biological perspective, understanding population dynamics and interconnections within the Arctic food web 
will enable the determination of key species that are most important for monitoring in the case of an oil spill. 
Monitoring approaches will need to take advantage of benchmarks, or reference points over time, rather than 
static baselines. Critical types of benchmark data for oil spill response in the Arctic include: 
 Spatial and temporal distributions and abundances for fishes, birds, and marine mammals; 
 Subsistence and cultural use of living marine resources; 
 Identification and monitoring of areas of biological significance; 
 Rates of change for key species; 
 Sensitivity of key Arctic species to hydrocarbons; 
 High-resolution coastal topography and shelf bathymetry;  
 Measurements of ice cover, thickness, and distribution. 
Additional research and development needs to include meteorological-ocean-ice forecast model systems at 
high temporal and spatial resolutions and better assimilation of traditional knowledge of sea state and ice 
behaviour into forecasting models. Releasing proprietary monitoring data from exploration activities would 
increase knowledge of Arctic benchmark conditions. When appropriate, Arctic communities could also release 
data that they hold regarding important sites for fishing, hunting, and cultural activities. 
Recent spills demonstrate the concrete risks for the region.  
In December 2004, a Malaysian cargo vessel traveling through Alaska’s Aleutian Islands lost engine power 
and ran aground. Six crew members died. Poor weather conditions prevented any response for several days. 
Within two weeks, nearby response equipment supplies were depleted and continued bad weather kept 
dispersant supplies from arriving for three weeks. The spill killed more than 1,600 birds, closed a local crab 
fishery and contaminated local beaches. This accident discharged 335,000 gallons of heavy fuel as cargo. 
Following the spill the fishing industry had to implement extreme and costly measures to ensure that oil did 
not contaminate their harvested product. 
In March 2006, a Dominican cargo ship collided with another vessel off the coast of Estonia, where it sank. 
Because Estonia lacked the resources to mount an effective response in icy conditions, a week passed before 
response vessels could be brought in from Finland. By then, much of the oil had spread to shallow areas 
inaccessible to these boats, further hampering clean-up efforts.  
A spill a month earlier near Estonia resulted in the deaths of 35,000 birds. 
In March 2006, a fuel oil spill was discovered when the ice began to break up near a chemical plant in south-
eastern Norway. The oil had already travelled down the Glomma River to an ocean inlet near a bird sanctuary 
and vacation area before it was detected. Strong currents, ice and cold prevented the use of the available 
response equipment, resulting in the oiling of 200 ducks and 80 swans. 
In December 2007, approximately 250,000 barrels of oil poured into the North Sea as it was being piped 
from an offshore platform to a loading buoy operated by Norwegian oil giant Statoil-Hydro. Weather including 
near-gale conditions and wave heights of 7 meters prevented the use of the available response equipment. 
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Shell's attempt to drill in 2012 ended with the drilling rig, the Kulluk, running around and needing to be 
rescued.  
The Arctic Challenger is the vessel proposed by Shell to flaring off oil and gas recovered from underwater 
hydrocarbon spill in the Arctic. The vessel represents the multinational energy corporation's hopes for 
demonstrating its technical know-how for cleaning up underwater Arctic oil spills. A 2012 executive 
presentation by Shell Oil’s President Marvin Odum suggests the Arctic Challenger is a key part of the 
company’s “cap and contain” plans to mitigate against major spills: in what the company says is an "unlikely" 
event of an underwater oil and gas blow out from its drilling operations, the ship would flare off the 
recovered hydrocarbons into the air. Shell and other companies have suspended Arctic drilling plans for 2014, 
but there is little doubt the push to develop the region's energy resources will continue. Further information:   
http://2knowabout.blogspot.it/2014/12/shells-arctic-challenger-to-burn-oil.html 
The remoteness of the area and the lack of basic infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, accommodation 
facilities) make operations for oil spill containment and response in Arctic extremely difficult and expensive. In 
addition, there is still significant undergoing research on very crucial questions regarding oil spill response in 
the Arctic which have not yet clearly answered, such as: how chemical dispersants and oil collection agents 
might work in a cold climate, how ice conditions and ocean currents will influence the fate of spilled oil, and 
how well microbes in the Arctic are able to degrade the hydrocarbons, as they tend to do in warmer climates.  
Arctic oil spill response is challenging because of: 
 Extreme weather and environmental conditions.  
 The lack of existing or sustained communications, logistical, and information infrastructure; 
significant geographic distances.  
 Vulnerability of Arctic species, ecosystems, and cultures.  
A fundamental understanding of the dynamic Arctic region is needed to help guide oil spill response and 
recovery efforts. Information on physical processes—including ocean circulation, ice cover, marine weather, 
and coastal processes—is important to frame the environmental context for the Arctic ecosystem and can 
help responders predict where oil will spread and how weathering might change its properties. Parameters 
such as air and water temperature, wind velocity, and hours of daylight are important considerations in 
choosing an effective and safe response strategy. 
Key response countermeasures and tools for oil removal in Arctic conditions include biodegradation (including 
oil treated with dispersants), in situ burning, chemical herders, mechanical containment and recovery, 
detection and tracking, and oil spill trajectory modelling.  
These are joined by the “no response” option of natural recovery, which is a viable alternative in some 
situations. No single technique applies in all situations. The oil spill response toolbox requires flexibility to 
evaluate and apply multiple response options, if necessary. Well-defined and well-tested decision processes 
are critical to expedite review and approval of countermeasure options in emergency situations. 
Timely and effective response to oil spills requires containment, recovery and restoration.  
Oil spills in polar seas are especially damaging because the natural conditions severely constrain an effective 
response. As a part of normal operations, ships produce a range of substances that must eventually be 
eliminated from the ship through discharge into the ocean, incineration or transfer to port-based reception 
facilities. Further information:  
http://www.arctis-search.com/Effects+of+Oil+Spills+in+Arctic+Waters 
There are currently inadequate techniques for recovering spilled oil in ice-covered environments. The solutions 
that today are available for oil spill recovery in the Arctic include mechanical methods, bio-remediation, in-situ 
burning and dispersants. The severity of contamination is not only dependent on the type of organisms 
exposed to oil, but also on the type and volumes of spilled oil, weathering processes, oil combating measures 
taken, and the location of the spill. Whether large oil spills require more time than smaller spills, the use of oil 
dispersants has usually more severe consequences on organisms than the mechanical and/or biological oil 
combating. On the basis of the extreme conditions of the environment in the Arctic, responding to oil spills is a 
key challenge along the various sailing routes, especially where ice is present. 
State-of-the-art information on Arctic activities can be found in the archive of the Arctic Council:  
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/  
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The Arctic Council was established in 1966 with the aim of promoting cooperation, coordination and 
interaction among the Arctic States on sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. 
This is carried out through the organization of Working Groups on different programmes (e.g. Arctic 
Contaminants, Arctic Monitoring, Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, Emergency Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response, Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment) whose activities are publicly available. 
Within these activities a very interesting and comprehensive report was made available by the task force on 
Pollution Prevention, in 2016; it was prepared by Proactima for the Norwegian Petroleum Authority acting on 
behalf of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The purpose of this report was to establish an overview 
of what has been done and what activities are in progress regarding technical and operational measures, 
specifically designed to prevent or contain the escape of fluids into the marine environment from offshore 
petroleum activities in Arctic and cold climate regions.  
This report titled “Overview of measures specifically designed to prevent oil pollution in the Arctic marine 
environment from offshore petroleum activities” can be downloaded from: 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1738/EDOCS-3194-v1-
ACSAOUS202_Fairbanks_2016_71a_Overview_Measures_OPP_Norway_report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y   
In this report the following undesirable events were considered as they may result in acute pollution from 
offshore installations in the Arctic:  
 Process leak;  
 Blowout;  
 Riser / pipeline / subsea structure leak;  
 Object on collision course;  
 Damage to structure;  
 Leak during loading / offloading. 
Based on the list of undesirable events a set of themes to be studied have been identified, i.e.: 
 Meteocean and ice conditions; 
 Ice management; 
 Drilling technology, well integrity and well control; 
 Pipelines and subsea structures; 
 Facility design; 
 Loading and offloading; 
 Communication solutions; 
 Human resources and competence; 
 Management; 
 Oil spill detection; 
 Development of new concepts for exploration and production activities. 
For each theme the information of interest was collected from industry and research institutions, as well as 
from open sources.  
A risk-based approach was considered to identify all measures (i.e. preventive and mitigating barriers, 
including the human dimension) available to avoid/contain the oil spill. 
The state of the art on technological and operational measures to prevent oil pollution, including on-going 
research projects and programs, is well described.  
The study concludes by providing some observations, recommendations and suggestions for further work. 
It may be also useful to mention that there are serious arguments against the exploitation of the Arctic: 
Greenpeace has started in 2012 the “Save the Arctic” campaign to protect the Arctic from oil drilling and 
industrial fishing. The campaign aims at prompting a United Nations resolution on protection for the Arctic. 
Further information: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Save_the_Arctic 
According to WWF, despite the efforts on prevention and safety measures, the lack of experience of deploying 
and operating spill response equipment in the Arctic makes it exceedingly difficult to predict or understand the 
response capabilities and limitations of current spill response systems. (See: ’Lessons Not learned. 20 Years 
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After the Exxon Valdez Disaster Little Has Changed in How We Respond to Oil Spills in the Arctic). Further 
information: https://wwf.fi/mediabank/983.pdf 
Several videos, dealing with the problem of risk of oil spill in the Arctic environment can easily be found on 
YouTube. Some of them are provided below: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JwCbWPR7VK8 
This video (6’ 30’’) highlights the point of views of the scientific community about the lack of knowledge in 
this area, and the perspectives of those who depend on the Arctic Ocean for their livelihood. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xyn4dAcP-Mc 
On the same subject is the content of the above video (6’ 14’’): Battle for the Arctic: Drill or Not to Drill. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mxN1yc_DikU 
Finally, this video (22’ 59’’) describes the organizational work on board of the Russian Prirazlomnaya platform 
operating on the Russian Shelf above the Arctic Circle. The “Kirill Lavrov” is the tanker that ferries the oil to 
land.  
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5 Safety and contingency plans in the Arctic 
5.1 The safety issue 
An accident scenario is a chain of events originated by a triggering event or threat and ending into a set of 
consequences depending on the behaviour of prevention, control and mitigation systems.  
Accident sequences are graphically represented in a “Bow-Tie” (BT) diagram in which the causes are placed on 
the left and the consequences on the right (Tarantola et al., 2018). 
The central element of a bow-tie is an undesirable event (UE) with the potential to cause harm, whose causes 
(on the left-hand side) and consequences (on the right-hand side) are determined. UEs are particular plant 
conditions describing an accidental situation in which the integrity of the installation is threatened. 
Three types of systems can be found in a Bow-Tie diagram. Prevention systems aim to avoid the occurrence 
of UEs or to reduce their occurrence frequency; the role of Control systems is to limit as much as possible the 
extent and/or the duration of undesirable events; and Mitigation systems aim at reducing the magnitude of 
damages when event evolve into accidents. All these safety-related systems and procedures are referred to 
as Safety Barriers. 
A threat is an event (simple or complex) which is able to cause the occurrence of an UE when all preventive 
measures fail, i.e. these events are the root causes or initiators of accident scenarios.  
Examples of simple threats: valve rupture; human error; mud pump failure; etc.  
Examples of complex threats: well kick; riser failure; drilling into shallow gas pockets; etc.  
Complex threats can be further decomposed into a set of simpler threats up to their root causes (e.g., by fault 
tree analysis).  
Triggering events can be subdivided into Natural (e.g. extreme weather conditions, earthquake, geological 
seabed instability) and anthropogenic (human/mechanical technical events). 
In the Arctic region natural events are mainly represented by the harsh environment and extreme weather 
conditions (e.g. extreme cold, ice on board, ice pack and icebergs on the sea, high winds, and darkness). Such 
harsh conditions can affect both equipment, leading to structural failure, and human psychology, challenging 
personnel often to the limit. 
Although in Tarantola et al. (2018) the aim was on general accidents occurring on board of offshore 
installations, in the present report the focus is on those accidents specifically related to mechanical or human 
failure stressed by extreme weather conditions, such as those in the Arctic area. 
As described in section 3, drilling and production platforms operating in the Arctic area must be properly 
winterized; systems installed for this purpose (e.g. anti-icing, anti-freezing, de-icing), will appear into the Bow-
Tie diagram since their failure implies the failure of the related winterized components. Moreover, the failure 
of these systems may also act as initiating events of accident sequences. 
The (probabilistic) safety analysis of a platform operating in the Arctic area can be performed by applying the 
classic procedure based on fault tree and event tree methodologies, whereas the assessment of the accident 
consequences may require the adaptation of dispersion models, especially on water. It seems that fire and 
explosion models do not require any modification, whereas specific models are needed for evaluating the 
dispersion of oil. 
The results of the analysis of all significant accident scenario are finally used for risk-assessment purposes to 
demonstrate that risks have been reduced to an “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP) level or that the 
plant design / management needs to be improved.  
Operations in offshore waters of the Member States of the European Union are mainly regulated by the 
offshore safety Directive 2013/30/EU with the objective to “… reduce as far as possible the occurrence of major 
accidents relating to offshore oil and gas operations and to limit their consequences, thus increasing the 
protection of the marine environment and coastal economies against pollution, establishing minimum 
conditions for safe offshore exploration and exploitation of oil and gas and limiting possible disruptions to 
Union indigenous energy production, and to improve the response mechanisms in case of an accident.”  
With reference to the Arctic waters, the offshore safety Directive recognises that “… Arctic waters are a 
neighbouring marine environment of particular importance for the Union, and play an important role in 
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mitigating climate change. The serious environmental concerns relating to the Arctic waters require special 
attention to ensure the environmental protection of the Arctic in relation to any offshore oil and gas operation, 
including exploration, taking into account the risk of major accidents and the need for effective response. 
Member States who are members of the Arctic Council are encouraged to actively promote the highest 
standards with regard to environmental safety in this vulnerable and unique ecosystem, such as through the 
creation of international instruments on prevention, preparedness and response to Arctic marine oil pollution, 
and through building, inter alia, on the work of the Task Force established by the Arctic Council and the existing 
Arctic Council Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines.” 
Regulations for drilling and production, including transportation, of oil and gas in the Arctic are based on safety 
principles. For instance, the regulations for the Norwegian petroleum industry apply for the entire continental 
shelf and the functional requirements are the same for the entire area. This means that any requirement 
related to health, safety or the environment must be met regardless of where the operation takes place. This 
also includes the Barents Sea (Personal communication with Sigve Knudsen, Norwegian Petroleum Safety 
Authority). 
There are some important principles in the regulations (cf. frame regulation § 10) requiring that: 
 The activities shall be prudent, based both on an individual and an overall assessment of all factors 
of relevance for planning and implementation of the activities as regards health, safety and the 
environment. 
 Consideration shall also be given to the specific nature of the activities, local conditions and 
operational assumptions. 
 A high level for health, safety and the environment shall be established, maintained and further 
developed. 
The regulations stipulate therefore a clear requirement that the nature of the activity and the local conditions 
shall be considered. Based on this, the requirement to fulfil a function may lead to different solutions 
(technical, operational or organizational) at varying locations on the continental shelf under the local 
conditions. This means that one may find different technical solutions in the North Sea, Norwegian Sea and 
the Barents Sea that fulfil the same requirement that applies to the entire continental shelf. The difference in 
solutions will be a direct response to the specific conditions at the location where the operation is to be 
performed. This is particularly the case for the need to perform winterization and the level of winterization of 
a facility or installation depending on the specific conditions at the location of the operation. 
State of the art solutions are developed by many stakeholders in the petroleum industry. The solutions evolve 
and improve as new experience and knowledge is applied. To enable industry to continuously improve and 
develop the solutions they apply, regulations describe a function rather than prescribing a solution. This is 
important as it gives the responsible party or the operator, the option to apply new technology as it is proven 
and becomes available. The responsibility to ensure prudent activities and the application of technological 
solutions that meet the regulations lie with the responsible party/operator. 
Norwegian regulations refer to standards that, when applied, are considered to specify a solution that meets 
or exceeds the functional requirement. Where the guidelines to the regulations specify a standard, the safety 
level described in the standard must be met or exceeded by the responsible party for the operation. An 
alternative to the standard may be used if this also meets or exceeds the safety level achieved by applying 
the standard. The development of standards is a responsibility that is taken by, amongst others, the 
petroleum industry. Typically, standards for the oil industry may be developed by organizations like 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP), 
Norwegian Oil and Gas and other relevant organizations. A detailed description of the development of 
standards within the petroleum industry has been documented in a report developed within the Arctic Council. 
The report is titled “Standardization as a tool for prevention of oil spills in the Arctic”. The report describes the 
organizations and processes involved in developing, maintaining and revising standards for the petroleum 
industry. The report and the related summary can be found at the following links on the Arctic Council 
website:  
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1951/2017-05-04-EPPR-Standardization-to-
prevent-oil-spills-long-version-report-complete-A4-size-DIGITAL.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
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From the open source investigation, a lot of other documents have been found, some of the more interesting 
ones are listed herewith. 
A very interesting thesis on RAM (Reliability Availability Maintainability) problems and solution methods for 
the analysis of safety barriers of oil and gas drilling and production installation in the Arctic can be 
downloaded from:  
https://munin.uit.no/bitstream/handle/10037/9972/thesis.pdf?sequence=6 
The Artificial Gravel Island of the Liberty Project, is a proposal to drill in Arctic waters from an artificial island. 
Further information: 
https://phys.org/news/2017-10-oil-company-arctic-drilling-artificial.html 
The paper “Effects of Cold Environments on Human Reliability Assessment in Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities” 
(The Journal of Human factors, November 26, 2013) proposes a new methodology that focuses on the effects 
of cold and harsh environments on the reliability of human performance. Further information: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0018720813512328 
In the article “Risk analysis of offshore transportation accident in Arctic waters” (The International Journal of 
Maritime Engineering, R. Abbassi et al, 2017) a methodology for risk analysis applicable to shipping in Arctic 
waters is introduced. Further information: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320347524_Risk_analysis_of_offshore_transportation_accident_in_
Arctic_waters 
“Risk Management in the Arctic Offshore: Wicked Problems Require New Paradigms”, ISER WP 2011.3. This 
research examines how various groups with interests in the Arctic offshore define risks. Further information: 
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/2011_10-riskmanagement.pdf 
“Oil spill risks assessed for offshore Arctic pipeline”. A. Dinovitzer et al, Offshore Mechanics and Arctic 
Engineering Conference, 2004, Vancouver.  
https://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-102/issue-40/transportation/oil-spill-risks-assessed-for-offshore-
arctic-pipeline.html 
X. Gao et al., “An approach for prediction of petroleum production facility performance considering Arctic 
influence factors”, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 95 (8), 2010. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0951832010000773 
5.2 Contingency plans 
The final output of the Bow-Tie model is a list of accident consequences resulting from the foreseen 
behaviour of the mitigation barriers. The emergency response plan is the ultimate measure of mitigation. A 
proper emergency plan, drafted with knowledge and taking into account the actual possible threats existing in 
each particular offshore installation is the leading key for the safest and easiest solution to an emergency. 
Indeed, a well-designed emergency response plan should be able to guide personnel to act not following their 
instincts but in a proper way, following pre-defined procedures. 
 
As described in Tarantola et al. (2018), the requirements of an emergency response plan can be summarized 
as follow:  
 Cooperation with contractors, authorities, and communication of the respective information 
available.  
 Capping systems (different techniques).  
 Clear definition of the chain of command and responsibility. 
 Temporary refuge details.  
 Details of evacuation and escape equipment.  
 Means of recovery to a safety place.  
More particularly, a contingency plan should:  
 be readily available in case of emergency.  
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 clearly identify the hierarchy of the emergency command structure for both the onshore and 
offshore bits and ensure a prior identification of competent and acknowledged personnel.  
 include the details of the emergency control room facilities and all the existing equipment and 
documentation.  
 include the periodical verification of the whole communication system.  
 verify that the key personnel have the proper knowledge and experience to make the 
communication system working.  
The above listed requirements are generally applicable also to activities carried out in the Arctic area. The 
open source offers a huge amount of documents dealing with the problem of emergency planning and 
response for drilling and production activities in warmer than Arctic environments. In the Arctic region the low 
temperature, darkness, polar low, long distances, etc., make the problem more difficult. Moreover, the 
presence of icebergs or ice pack on the sea, call for strong interaction and information sharing between ice 
surveillance and navigation crews; hence, new organizational command and control solutions need 
development for reducing reaction times. Also, novel hull shapes require investigation, to minimize ice impact 
on operations as described in Section 3. 
From the open source investigation performed on the emergency planning and response problems, many 
interesting documents, especially from the stakeholders’ point of view have been found. Some of these 
documents are herewith listed: 
The paper “Emergency response and environment restoration. Perspectives on emergency response in the 
Canadian Arctic” is one of a three-part series focused on a hypothetical sinking of the MS Arctic Sun in 
Cumberland Sound, Nunavut, Canada. The series is part of a larger project on Emergency Management 
Preparedness in the Arctic being undertaken by the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program. Further information: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Joice_K_joseph/post/Hello_Can_anyone_suggest_some_disaster_manage
ment_aspects_for_the_Arctic_region/attachment/59d6353879197b8077992d15/AS%3A383454068920320
%401468433982276/download/MS+Arctic+Sun+Case+Study+-+Part+B.pdf 
The project “Oil Spill Preparedness in Small Communities” was approved by the Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness and Response (EPPR) Working Group of the Arctic Council in June 2015. The project co-leads 
Norway, U.S., Canada and Aleut International Association developed a community self-assessment tool that 
will help EPPR better understand community preparedness and risk exposure. Further information: 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2079/2017_03_15_PPR_Oil-Spill-Response-
report-%20FINAL.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
“Arctic: Emergency response - Offshore operations in the Barents Sea”. This position paper from DNV GL aims 
to provide insight into the feasibility of emergency preparedness solutions for the Barents Sea, and highlights 
where existing technology might be applicable and where new concepts need to be developed. The DNV report 
is available on request at the following address: 
https://www.dnvgl.com/oilgas/arctic/arctic-emergency-response.html 
Schmied J. et al. (2017), “Maritime Operations and Emergency Preparedness in the Arctic–Competence 
Standards for Search and Rescue Operations Contingencies in Polar Waters ”. In: Latola K., Savela H. (eds), 
The Interconnected Arctic — UArctic Congress 2016. Springer Polar Sciences, Springer, Cham. 
This paper elaborates on the operational competence requirements for key personnel involved in large 
scale SAR (Search And Rescue) operations. Findings from real SAR incidents and exercises provide in-depth 
understanding on the operational challenges. From the list of references, the reader is addressed to other 
interesting papers on the subject. Further information:  
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-57532-2_25 
The Arctic Council Working Group on Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) addresses 
prevention, preparedness and response to environmental emergencies in the Arctic. The working group will 
increase emergency response capacity with people who live and work in the Arctic. Prevention and safety are 
also focus areas. Safety systems and guidelines for worker health and safety are planned. Further 
information: 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/eppr 
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The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) is a multilateral, non-binding 
agreement among Arctic states on environmental protection in the Arctic. It was adopted in 1991 
by Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The AEPS 
deals with monitoring, assessment, protection, emergency preparedness/response, and conservation of the 
Arctic zone. Further information: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arctic_Environmental_Protection_Strategy  
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6 Accidents on Arctic and sub-Arctic offshore installations 
6.1 Introduction 
A common feature of all offshore Oil & Gas operations is that they always entail the risk of a major accident 
which may have severe and multifaceted consequences to many recipients. The risk of a major accident 
becomes even higher as Oil & Gas companies move their drilling rigs into deeper waters and harsher marine 
environments driven by the depletion of the easily accessible hydrocarbon reserves. 
An accident in an offshore Oil & Gas installation has the potential to cause a large scale of human, economic, 
and environmental disaster. The resulting impacts may involve loss of human lives, injuries, environmental 
pollution of the surrounding marine and coastal areas, direct and indirect economic losses for the affected 
population and the involved companies, deterioration of the energy supply security and fluctuations in the oil 
production rates & prices. From all the above, it becomes clear that the negative impacts of an accident in an 
offshore installation may be very hard to quantify precisely. In order to illustrate the severity and the wide 
range of impacts that may result from an accident in an offshore installation it was found necessary to 
introduce Annex 1 & Annex 2. 
In Annex 1 the blowout of the Macondo well (20 April 2010, Gulf of Mexico) was selected as a case study 
because it is a recent, landmark accident which is recognised as one of the world’s biggest offshore disasters. 
Since then, there has been sufficient time to assess the impacts of the accident at their full extent. Moreover, 
the technological status of the modern offshore installations which are in operation nowadays, do not differ 
much from that of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig.  
In Annex 2 a list of the most catastrophic accidents in the offshore Oil & Gas industry (in terms of human 
casualties and volume of oil spilled) is presented. All the above data, constitute valuable information for every 
future attempt to produce hydrocarbons in the Arctic or sub-Arctic Seas. 
A recently published study (Ismail et al. 2014) provides an evaluation of the accidents that occurred in 
offshore Oil & Gas installations operating all over the world over the last 56 years (1956 – 2012). From the 
analysis of 219 major accidents in jack-ups, drill ships, semi-submersible and platforms it was observed that 
most of the accidents are attributed to human error or failure of equipment. It was also noticed that most of 
the accidents were routine accidents meaning that similar accidents have happened elsewhere sometime in 
the past. Finally, it was remarked that vast majority of accidents are not attributed to only one cause but to a 
synergy of multiple failures – causes. In Figure 6.1 the percentage distribution of the basic causes of 
accidents in offshore installations is illustrated. It becomes clear that the most frequent causes of accidents 
in an offshore installation are the blowouts (46,1%) followed by storms (15,1%) and structural failures 
(11,4%). [27] 
Apart from being the most frequent cause of accident, offshore blowouts also carry the biggest risk in terms 
of the extent and the cost of the induced damage. Ιn case of a blowout accident, large quantities of crude oil 
may be released uncontrollably  for weeks, or even months with severe economic and environmental impacts. 
As it is illustrated in Annex 1, most of the economic damage from the Macondo well blowout was not 
attributed to the loss of the Deepwater Horizon platform but to clean up costs, fines and court-ordered 
compensations to oil spill victims. According to the SINTEF Offshore Blowout Database, 642 offshore 
blowouts / well releases have occurred world-wide since 1955. [28] 
According to an impact assessment which was published (2011) by the European Commission, the direct, 
tangible costs for offshore accidents in Europe are estimated to range from €205 to €915 million annually. 
 39 
 
Figure 6.1. Distribution of main causes of accidents in offshore installations (Source: Ismail et al., 2014) [27] 
 
Up today, there is no adequate, recorded number of accidents in offshore installations in the Arctic, which 
could be used for statistical analysis, since operating durations (exposure times) of the Arctic offshore 
installations have been very limited. Nevertheless, in future field developments, accidents triggered by harsh 
environmental conditions are expected to be more frequent in Arctic than in other parts of the world. Strong 
winds, high waves, low temperatures, icing, icebergs and poor visibility are significant promoters and triggers 
of accidents. 
A recent study conducted by the Joint Research Centre (2017) gives an overview of the incidents triggered by 
natural hazards at offshore installations in harsh environments. According to the paper, the most frequently 
damaged offshore installations are the semi-submersible units and the highest likelihood for an accident to 
occur is during exploration drilling or transfer operations. Moreover, the paper raises safety concerns for the 
offshore operations as there are indications for a future rougher maritime climate and global worsening of 
extreme metocean conditions due to climate change. [26] 
Past accident analysis is of fundamental importance for the prevention of their reoccurrence in the future. For 
this reason, a database of accidents in the Arctic Seas along with lessons learnt from landmark accidents are 
presented in the following paragraphs of the Chapter. 
6.2 Accident Database 
Transparency and exchange of information on past offshore incidents and accidents is of paramount 
importance for preventing the recurrence of similar accidents in the future. The availability of accurate data 
on past offshore accidents provides the basis for their statistical analysis and the overall risk management of 
offshore Oil & Gas operations. More specifically, through accident statistics it becomes possible to identify: 
 The associated risk of different types of offshore operations;  
 The associated risk of different types of offshore installations;    
 Any trends or cycles in the occurrence of offshore accidents;  
 The safety performance of Oil & Gas operators.  
In that context, several databases on past offshore accidents have been developed at national or international 
level. Accident databases at national level are developed by Regulatory Authorities in accordance to legislative 
requirements and the corresponding data refer to accidents in the continental shelf of a specific country 
whereas accident databases at international level are developed by International Associations and the 
corresponding data refer to accidents anywhere in the world or in a group of countries. In Table 6.1 accident 
databases which contain (not exclusively) data on accidents in offshore Oil & Gas installations in the Arctic 
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are presented. It must be mentioned that up today there is no a common database for Arctic countries to 
collect and share data on accidents and other incident events that occurred in the Arctic Seas. However, an 
effort to gather accident data from all the Arctic countries is made by the Arctic Council via the Arctic 
Offshore Oil and Gas Regulatory Resource (AOOGRR). Further information: 
https://www.pame.is/index.php/aoogrr-by-topic/accident-and-incident-reporting 
Table 6 1 Offshore accident databases which contain data from operations in the Arctic Seas 
 
A common feature of all offshore accident databases is that they are not directly available to the public as 
there is a need to protect sensitive and confidential information. A very comprehensive source of offshore 
accident information for public use is the Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD) operated by Det 
Norske Veritas (DNV). WOAD data are not publicly available but can be accessible through a database 
subscription (with charge). For the purposes of the present report and in order to extract data related to 
accidents in the Arctic Seas the WOAD database has been used as the main source of information. 
Regulation gaps 
Offshore accidents and incidents, especially occupational safety events are being reported to national 
Regulatory Authorities according to national legislations. An existing regulation gap is that Arctic countries 
have different labour and environmental legislations and as a consequence the definition of what 
constitutes a reportable accident varies among each country. In some countries one or more days of absence 
from work following an incident is considered as a reportable event, whereas others require the absence for 
at least three subsequent days as the necessary condition. Another example worth citing is that in Russia, oil 
leaks which are less than eight tons are classified as incidents and therefore remain unreported and carry no 
penalty under the existent laws. It should also be mentioned that in Russia the regulatory framework is not so 
strict over the established National Oil Companies, especially in cases where there is a conflict with Russian 
economic or geopolitical interests. [30] [32] [33] 
Furthermore, the existing legislative framework for occupational health and safety focuses on serious 
accidents resulting in fatalities, injuries or damages to the installations. As a result, near misses are not 
always reported by the operators because it is not a legal requirement. However, it has been identified from 
lessons learnt, that the inclusion of near misses in the accident databases is of fundamental importance. It is 
worth mentioning that Transocean drilling company had an incident (23 Dec 2009) on one of its North Sea 
rigs similar to that which caused Deepwater Horizon disaster a few months later (20 Apr 2010). 
Unfortunately, information about this near miss was not disclosed, not even to Transocean employees of the 
installations operating in the Gulf of Mexico. Should Transocean have learned from the near-miss in the North 
Sea, the Macondo accident could have been avoided. [31] 
Another regulation gap which must be underlined is the fact that the Regulatory Authorities and the 
involved International Associations do not have a common format of reporting the accidents and 
incidents in their databases. As a result, the exchange of information between different databases is hindered. 
Finally, it must be highlighted that the accidents in all existing databases are recorded without making any 
reference to the operating durations (exposure times) of the corresponding installations. The reporting of 
Regulatory Authorities which maintain Accident Databases at National level 
Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) - Norway 
Danish Energy Agency (DEA) - Denmark 
Danish Working Environment Authority (DWEA) - Denmark 
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) - USA 
National Energy Board (NEB) - Canada 
Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) - Canada 
Accident Databases at International level International Associations 
SINTEF Offshore Blowout Database SINTEF 
Well Control Incident Database (WCID) IOGP 
Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD) DNV 
Performance Measurement Project (PMP) International Regulators' Forum (IRF) 
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the time interval within which accidents take place could determine the rate in every offshore platform and 
therefore generate a clearer image of the differences in the safety performance between offshore 
installations in the Arctic and offshore installations in the rest of the world.  
The Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD)  
One of the most reliable sources of information on accidents occurring in the offshore oil and gas industry is 
the Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD) operated by Det Norske Veritas (DNV). WOAD comprises 
information of 6451 events (accidents, incidents and failures) occurring to 3795 operating units from 1970 to 
2013. The databank is continuously being updated with the latest information available from authorities, 
official publications, reports, newspapers, databases, rig owners, and operators globally. The data of WOAD 
are not publicly available but are accessible through a database subscription (with charge).  
It must be underlined that WOAD is composed of worldwide data, collected and compiled by DNV which is an 
International Association and not a Regulatory Authority. This implies that the completeness of the accident 
database depends on the availability of the data and not on compulsory data registration from the operators. 
As a consequence, most of the records in WOAD database, refer to accidents which occurred in countries 
willing to share accident related information. From all the above, the following deductions could be made: 
 The geographical distribution of the recorded accidents is not representative of the offshore safety 
performance of the countries mentioned. 
 Since not all of the offshore accidents are reported, the WOAD constitutes an underestimation of the 
real situation.  
 
Within the WOAD database, the records are classified into the following 4 categories: 
 
1. Accidents for all the hazardous situations which have caused fatalities or severe injuries. 
 
2. Incidents for all the hazardous situations which have caused minor injuries to personnel or low 
degree of damages to the installation which require repairs or replacements.  
 
3. Near-misses for all the situations that might have or could have developed into an accident. No 
damages to the installation occurred and no repairs were required. 
 
4. Insignificant events for all the situations with minor consequences. No damages to the installation 
occurred and no repairs were required. This category also includes minor personnel injuries and small 
spills of crude oil or chemicals. 
 
Generally, there is a relationship between the numbers of different types of accidents, the distribution of 
which could be depicted as an accident triangle. Every recorded major accident, implies the occurrence of 
many more, less serious or near miss incidents which most of the times remain unreported. As a 
consequence, the accident distribution in the WOAD database could be characterised as more oriented to the 
major accidents and deviates from the real, triangular accident distribution which is illustrated in Figure 6.2.  
 
 
Figure 6.2. Accident Triangle (Source: DNV GL) [34] 
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Method used 
In order to retrieve data of accidents in Arctic or sub-Arctic installations, the Worldwide Offshore Accident 
Databank (WOAD) was found to be the most suitable database. In the WOAD 2013 update, there was a record 
of 6415 events on offshore installations globally, covering the period 1970 - 2013. A subset of accidents that 
occurred only in the Arctic or sub-Arctic Seas was isolated. In total, 36 events were identified which are 
depicted in Table 6.2 & Table 6.3 (light grey indication). Concerning offshore accidents occurred after 2013, 
11 events were identified through publicly available information, which are depicted in Table 6.3 (dark grey 
indication). The combined data collection from the WOAD and other publicly available sources resulted in the 
registration of 47 accidents in Arctic or sub-Arctic offshore installations during the period 1980 – 2019. It 
must be noted that the resulted statistical sample of accidents (47 accidents) is too small to be used for 
further statistical analysis where general accident trends could be defined. For this reason, all identified 
accidents are just presented in chronological order in Table 6.2 & Table 6.3. 
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Table 6 2 List of accidents in offshore installations in Arctic & sub-Arctic Seas (1980 -2019) - Part A 
Nr Accident Date Accident Category Name of unit Field / Block  Country Fatalities Injuries 
1 10/15/1980 Accident Okha (Jack-up) Sea of Okhotsk (Sakhalin)  Russia   
2 4/23/1981 Incident Ross (Semi-submersible) Barents Sea (7119/12-2) Norway   
3 9/28/1981 Incident Canmar Explorer (Drill ship) Beaufort Sea  Canada   
4 9/20/1982 Accident Key Singapore (Jack-up) Bering Sea (Nuniwak)  U.S.A.   
5 1/24/1983 Accident Valentin Shashin (Drill ship) Pechora Sea (KOLA-1) Russia   
6 9/14/1983 Accident CBIR No 2 (Drill barge) Beaufort Sea United States   
7 12/15/1983 Accident Kulluk (Submersible) Beaufort Sea Canada   
8 5/12/1985 Incident John Shaw (Semi-submersible) Labrador Sea Canada   
9 5/23/1985 Accident Grayling (Jacket) Gulf of Alaska (Cook Inlet) United States   
10 12/1/1987 Insignificant Polar Pioneer (Semi-submersible) Barents Sea (7219/9-1) Norway   
11 12/20/1987 Accident Steelhead (Jacket) Gulf of Alaska (Cook Inlet) United States   
12 12/24/1988 Accident Kulluk (Submersible) Beaufort Sea United States   
13 9/22/1993 Incident Canmar Explorer (Drill ship) Beaufort Sea United States   
14 9/29/1994 Incident Endicott (Jacket) Beaufort Sea (Endicott) United States   
15 4/25/1997 Accident Ocean Alliance (Semi-submersible) Norwegian Sea (6707/10-1) Norway   
16 1/21/1998 Incident Ocean Alliance (Semi-submersible) Norwegian Sea (6706/11-1) Norway   
17 2/26/1998 Near miss Ocean Alliance (Semi-submersible) Norwegian Sea (6706/11-1) Norway   
18 9/27/1999 Incident SAKHALIN 2 (FPSO/FSU) Sea of Okhotsk (Sakhalin) Russia   
19 1/18/2001 Incident Tyonek (Jacket) Gulf of Alaska (Tyonek) United States   
20 1/18/2001 Accident Bell 206L-1 (Helicopter) Gulf of Alaska (Tyonek) United States   
21 4/21/2002 Accident King Salmon (Jacket) Gulf of Alaska (Cook Inlet) United States  4 
22 8/21/2002 Incident Cook Inlet (Pipeline) Gulf of Alaska (Cook Inlet) United States   
23 2/1/2004 Insignificant Alaska North Star (Jacket) Beaufort Sea (North Star) United States   
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Table 6 3 List of accidents in offshore installations in Arctic & sub-Arctic Seas (1980 -2019) - Part B 
Nr Accident Date Accident Category Name of unit Field / Block  Country Fatalities Injuries 
24 2/8/2005 Insignificant Eirik Raude (Semi-submersible) Barents Sea Norway   
25 2/16/2005 Insignificant Eirik Raude (Semi-submersible) Barents Sea Norway   
26 4/12/2005 Incident Eirik Raude (Semi-submersible) Barents Sea Norway   
27 12/13/2005 Near miss Polar Pioneer (Semi-submersible) Norwegian Sea (Snøhvit) Norway   
28 2/12/2006 Near miss Polar Pioneer (Semi-submersible) Norwegian Sea (Snøhvit) Norway   
29 2/16/2007 Incident Northstar (Artificial Island) Beaufort Sea (North Star) United States   
30 11/24/2007 Incident SAKHALIN 2 (FPSO/FSU) Sea of Okhotsk (Sakhalin) Russia   
31 11/29/2009 Accident Lisburne (Pipeline) Beaufort Sea (Prudhoe Bay) United States   
32 12/17/2011 Accident Kolskaya (Jack-up) Sea of Okhotsk (Sakhalin) Russia 53 3 
33 4/9/2012 Accident Nikaitchuq (Artificial Island) Beaufort Sea (Nikaitchuq) United States 1  
34 7/14/2012 Incident Noble Discoverer (Drill ship) Alaska (Dutch Harbor) United States   
35 9/4/2012 Incident Scarabeo 8 (Semi-submersible) Barents Sea (7220/10-1) Norway   
36 12/31/2012 Accident Canmar Kulluk (Drill barge) Gulf of Alaska (Sitkalidak) United States   
37 10/2/2014 Accident Baker platform [13] Gulf of Alaska (Cook Inlet) U.S.A.   
38 11/8/2014 Accident GSP Saturn (Jack-up) [4] Pechora Sea Russia   
39 6/3/2015 Incident Fennica (Ice management vessel) [12] Alaska (Dutch Harbor) U.S.A.   
40 4/17/2016 Near miss Goliat (FPSO) [6] Barents Sea Norway   
41 6/25/2016 Accident Goliat (FPSO) [10] Barents Sea Norway  1 
42 2/7/2017 Accident Hilcorp Energy (Pipeline) [3] Gulf of Alaska (Cook Inlet) United States   
43 3/29/2017 Near miss SeaRose (FPSO) [11] Labrador Sea (White Rose) Canada   
44 4/13/2018 Incident Goliat (FPSO) [7] Barents Sea Norway   
45 6/17/2018 Near miss Melkøya (Industrial Island) [8] Norwegian Sea (Snøhvit) Norway   
46 9/16/2018 Near miss Goliat (FPSO) [5] Barents Sea Norway   
47 1/16/2019 Near miss West Hercules (Semi-submersible) [9] Barents Sea (7132/2-1) Norway   
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6.3 Landmark Accidents 
6.3.1 Kolskaya jack-up drilling rig (Sea of Okhotsk, 17 Dec 2011) 
 
Figure 6.3. The Kolskaya drilling rig under tow shortly before it sunk [1] 
General description of the accident 
Report of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation 
According to investigators, in April 2011, OAO AMNGR and OOO Gazflot concluded a contract on construction 
of prospecting borehole Pervoocherednaya-1. Under the contract the Kolskaya oil rig drilled the borehole in 
the West section of Kamchatka offshore in the period between August and December of 2011. On finishing 
the drilling, OAO Far Eastern Marine Steamship Line and OAO AMNGR agreed on towing the Kolskaya oil rig 
from the drilling site to the port of Korsakov, Sakhalin Region. The Magadan icebreaker and the Neftegaz-55 
towing vessel were employed to do the job. 
Under the agreement the route of the towing went along the west shore of Kamchatka and Kuril Islands. The 
towing distance amounted to 917 miles. Under the requirements of Safe Towing Regulations the maximum 
towing speed should not be over 3.2 knots and if the waves are over 4 meters high and wind speed is over 
17.1 m/s the pillars have to be lowered by two flights (about 13.12 m lower than the level of the main deck) 
and drift should be started. Head of OAO AMNGR Fleet Operation and Navigation Safety Service was 
appointed responsible for the towing. 
On the order of deputy general director for safety of navigation Boris Likhvan the Kolskaya oil rig with 67crew 
members aboard started to be towed away on 11 December 2011. Acting chief engineer Bordzilovsky ignored 
repeated demands of chief of the Kolskaya oil rig that it was necessary to evacuate 28 people not involved in 
towing and forbade the evacuation by an oral order. During 5 days the towing went on normally. Then the 
weather suddenly worsened. The responsible for the towing operation, wanted to outrun the cyclone and 
made an unauthorized decision to raise the speed up to 4.8 knots, which he reported to Likhvan (acting 
deputy general director) and Bordzilovsky (acting chief engineer). The latter did not give orders to drop the 
speed to the allowed limits. As a result of the excess of the maximum speed allowed for towing the plating of 
the oil rig got deformed and then got cracks in it. Water started coming inside the platform and sometime 
later the oil rig was brought down by the bow. The accused received several reports through satellite 
communication that it was necessary to lower the leg chords to make the rig drift. The two men, however, 
hoping on the favourable outcome, ignored these alarming signals and did not take any timely measures to 
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lower the leg chords. Up to 25 m/sec squalls of wind and 4-5m high waves tore away the pod of the bow. The 
damaged plating started to let the water in ballast tanks and the oil rig got a trim. Leaktightness of water-
proof shutoffs at the top deck was broken. The water kept going into the machine room, while the pumps 
could not manage, which caused further draught and trim and subsequent progressing flooding of not 
damaged compartments of the oil rig. Almost 24 hours later the accused gave a belated order to lower the 
leg chords, but the trim (list) made it impossible. 
Realizing that the situation was critical with the trim getting bigger and bigger and foreseeing unavoidable 
wreck of the rig and death of people aboard, the accused did nothing to organize a rescue operation in order 
to save some money. They ignored recommendations of the duty officer of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Marine Rescue 
Center to timely send SOS signal and did not dispatch rescue helicopters. Despite the prohibition and inaction 
of the leadership, at 9:45 AM, on 18 December 2011, due to the critical situation the captain sent an SOS, but, 
unfortunately, it was too late. At 12:46 PM, the same day, the Kolskaya oil rig capsized and sank in the Sea of 
Okhotsk at the depth of over 1.000 meters killing 53 crew members and injuring 3. [2] 
Lessons learned 
The sinking of Kolskaya oil rig, which led to the death of 53 people, is attributed to the synergy of multiple 
violations of safety rules and requirements, as listed below: 
1. Nonessential personnel were exposed to unnecessary risk. From the total 67 crew members, 
28 people should have evacuated the platform before the start of the towing.  
 
2. The safety standards set by the manufacturer were violated. More specifically, in the 
determination of the limitations for sea towing, the platform’s manufacturer (Rauma-Repola) 
explicitly stated: Towing is prohibited in the winter, in winter seasonal zones. [35] 
 
3. The safety regulations set by the national authorities were violated. More specifically, it has 
been clearly regulated by the Russian authorities that in the Sea of Okhotsk towing of jack-up rigs 
with operating limits for a Class 6 sea state must be completed by 10th of October. Towing of all 
other jack-up rigs should must be completed before 15th of October. Other safe towing regulations 
were violated as well. The maximum towing speed should not be over 3.2 knots but instead, a 
decision to raise the speed up to 4.8 knots was taken. Moreover, in the prevailing weather conditions, 
the pillars of the platform should have been lowered by two flights which never happened. [36] 
 
4. Escape, Evacuation, and Rescue (EER) operations never occurred. The crew members did not 
follow any procedure to evacuate the platform in a systematic manner.   Furthermore, the SOS signal 
was sent too late, only 3 hours before the sinking of the rig, making impossible the successful 
implementation of any external emergency response plan.   
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6.3.2 Kulluk conical drilling rig (Gulf of Alaska, 31 Dec 2017) 
 
Figure 6.4. Shell's drilling rig Kulluk, off Sitkalidak Island in Alaska (Source: United States Coast Guard) 
 
General description of the accident 
The Kulluk oil rig was an ice-class, Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) owned by Shell and operated by 
Noble Drilling. In October 2012 Kulluk had finished the Arctic drilling season in Camden Bay in the Beaufort 
Sea and a towing operation was prepared to reach the port of Seattle for the necessary offseason repairs. 
The first part of the plan involved the towing of the Kulluk oil rig from Camden Bay to Dutch Harbor (Unalaska 
Island) using the ice-class tow supply vessel Aiviq and it was carried out successfully. 
On December 21, the second part of the towing plan was launched which involved the towing of the Kulluk oil 
rig from the Dutch Harbor to the Port of Seattle a 2.000-mile trip which was expected to last three to four 
weeks with Aiviq to be the sole towing vessel. 
On December 27, the two vessels were approximately 50 miles southeast of Sitkalidak Island. The prevailing 
weather conditions corresponded to winds of 15-20 knots and sea swells of 20-25 feet. Based on historical 
data, winds and waves of that size are not unusual during winter months in the Gulf of Alaska and should 
have been expected. As a consequence of the tow overload, the shackle connecting the tow line to the 
monkey’s face failed, the tow was lost and Kulluk was set adrift. Nevertheless, the emergency tow line (with 
less tensile load capacity) was connected to the Kulluk. In the same day, all four engines of Aiviq failed which 
was attributed to seawater contamination of the fuel tanks. With no propulsion, Kulluk and Aiviq were set 
adrift in heavy seas.  
On December 28, two more support vessels arrived on the scene, the Alex Haley and the Guardsman but 
without being able to contribute substantially to the towing operation despite all the efforts. An unsuccessful 
attempt was also made to evacuate the 18 crew members of Kulluk with helicopters but due to the prevailing 
high winds, safe evacuation was precluded. 
On December 29, new fuel injectors were delivered to Aiviq and as a result all four engines were restored. 
Moreover, two helicopters managed to evacuate all the personnel of Kulluk oil rig. In the meanwhile, Alex 
Haley was instructed to depart for repairs and Nanuq support vessel arrived on the scene. 
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On December 30, the tow line connecting the Nanuq vessel with the Kulluk parted, whereas shortly after the 
same happened with the emergency tow line of the Aiviq vessel. Kulluk was set adrift at prevailing winds of 
35-45 knots and sea swells of 20-25 feet. The support vessel Tug Alert arrived on the scene but it was 
impossible to set connection with the Kulluk due to the intense weather phenomena. 
On December 31, the Tug Alert vessel was successfully connected with the emergency tow line (previously 
used by Aiviq) and started towing Kulluk away from the shore. In the same day, the Aiviq vessel re-
established tow of the Kulluk by using the rig’s anchor wire. The two vessels had the intention to tow Kulluk 
towards a safe harbor on the Northeast side of Sitkalidak Island approximately 74 miles away. In prevailing 
winds of 40-50 knots the Aiviq’s tow parted and Kulluk started pulling Tug Alert backwards towards Sitkalidak 
Island. Since there wasn’t any possibility for the Aiviq vessel to reconnect with Kulluk, there was no other 
option for the Tug Alert vessel but to release the tow. Less than an hour later, Kulluk grounded on a beach on 
Sitkalidak Island. 
At the time of the accident, the Kulluk oil rig was carrying around 143.000 gallons of low-sulfur diesel oil and 
12.000 gallons of other petroleum products. It must be stated that no environmental damage was reported 
as a result of the grounding. All personnel were successfully evacuated without any casualties or injuries. As 
far as the Kulluk oil rig is concerned, inspections after the accident revealed substantial damages in the 
underwater portions of the hull, the electrical equipment, the lifesaving and safety equipment and several 
interior and engineering spaces. Nevertheless, the watertight integrity was retained. When the rig was 
recovered, the repairs were not deemed feasible and Shell decided to scrap the unit in 2014. 
The developed towing plan had been complied with all the established standards and procedures of that time. 
It was of fundamental importance the fact that it was not selected the shortest route but a coastal route 
always within 200 miles from land so as to remain within the range of SAR helicopters. Furthermore, despite 
of the fact that the Kulluk could accommodate 108 persons, during the towing operation only a basic crew of 
18 people was on board. These two key points facilitated the rescue operation and prevented any casualties. 
[37] [38] [39] [40] 
Lessons learned 
1. People without the adequate expertise, found in charge for the final approval of the 
towing plan. More specifically, the Alaska Venture Operations Manager was initially considered as 
the final approval authority but as he was on holiday at the time, the final approval was given by a 
deputy who had never reviewed a tow plan within Shell, had not participated in any of the planning 
meetings, and had not received any related training or even guidance about the process. [37] 
2. The weather phenomena were underestimated. The towing plan that was approved for the 
transit of December 2012 was exactly the same with the towing plans that had been used for the 
transits of June, August and November of 2012 (same towing vessel and towing configuration). The 
particularities of the winter weather conditions in the Alaskan waters were not taken into 
consideration in the December towing plan. In addition, none of the ships deck officers had worked 
before in Alaskan waters during wintertime. The general lack of experience in adverse weather that 
characterized the crew, was displayed by several actions during the towing operation. [37] 
3. The tow plan was designed with an insufficient margin of safety. Redundancy is a necessary 
element in all operations which involve high risk like towing in Alaskan waters during winter months. 
In order to provide an order of magnitude it could be mentioned that according to the technical 
studies of that time, the required towing power (bollard pull) for the towing of the Kulluk oil rig, was 
estimated to be 200 tons whereas the maximum towing power of the tow vessel (Aiviq) was 208 
tons. If the plan had involved additional towing vessels, the consequences of the mechanical failures 
that came up could have been mitigated. [37] [38] 
4. There are regulation gaps in the inspection regime. The 120 t SWL shackle which was the 
source of the original loss of tow, was not examined thoroughly prior to the commencement of the 
voyage as there wasn’t such a regulatory requirement. The shackle was only undergone a visual 
inspection which is insufficient for the determination of its suitability or the detection of hidden 
defects. Moreover, the history of the shackle could not be ascertained, as it was installed without 
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knowledge of where or how it was used. Similarly, for other crucial mechanical parts of the towing 
operation, like the tow line and the tow gear. [39] 
5. It was given greater value to the maximization of profit against safety. Although not 
officially declared by Shell, it seems that the real reason for which the towing operation started at 21 
of December, despite the very bad weather forecast, was to bring the Kulluk rig out of the Alaskan 
waters before the turn of the year so as to avoid being charged several million dollars in tax.  
Generally, it should be mentioned that the time window for drilling in the Arctic Seas is very short and it is a 
common practice for oil companies to tow their drilling platforms in southern regions before the start of the 
winter months. Since the towing of drilling rigs is extremely vulnerable to bad weather and storms there 
should be greater oversight of the frequent towing operations in the Arctic and sub-Arctic Seas.  
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7 Recent research activities 
7.1 Introduction 
As conventional oil is getting depleted worldwide, reserves in the less accessible Arctic waters will increasingly 
receive the attention of the involved countries and the oil & gas industry.  A key parameter which determines 
the future of exploration and production of hydrocarbons in the Arctic is the capability of the available 
technologies to prevent and respond successfully to an accidental oil spill in the Arctic waters. The objective of 
Chapter 7 of this report, is to provide a brief overview of the available Oil Spill Response Technologies that 
could be used in the Arctic, to identify any possible knowledge gaps and to summarise the most notable 
research activities of the last decade.     
Oil Spill Prevention, Control and Response in Arctic areas, include the same general suite of countermeasures 
applied elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, oil spill response strategy for Arctic seas must additionally take 
into consideration the following determinant parameters: 
 Periods of extended darkness complicate any type of offshore response operation. During winter 
months there is no possibility for visual oil spill detection and for aircrafts to operate. 
 Remoteness, great distances and lack of shore – based infrastructure (ports, airports) make the 
support of any offshore response operation much more complicated. Operators should be entirely 
self-sufficient. 
 The harsh operating environment (extreme cold and ice) undermines safety of the personnel and 
operability of the equipment. 
 The ice cover in the Arctic seas is dynamic and unpredictable. Growing or moving ice can undermine 
oil detection (oil can be trapped on or under ice) and the effectiveness of clean-up activities. 
Over the last decades the oil & gas industry made significant research efforts to develop robust technology to 
prevent and respond effectively to accidental oil spills in Arctic waters. It must be pointed out that most of the 
research was carried out in U.S.A and Canada. Indicatively, according to USARC, in 11 years (from 2000 to 
2010) over $164 million were funded by the U.S. Federal Government and 248 research projects were 
compiled. The most notable research effort of the oil & gas industry in the last decade, is the Arctic Oil Spill 
Response Technology Joint Industry Programme (JIP) which was initiated in 2012 and completed in 2017 and 
its predecessor Oil in Ice Joint Industry Programme (JIP) which was initiated in 2006 and completed in 2009. 
[12] [13] [14]  
It is true that after the tragedy of Deepwater Horizon oil spill (April 2010) global research activity has given 
special importance in the upgrading of all Oil Spill Response Technologies: In Situ Burning, Dispersants, 
Mechanical Oil Recovery and Detection - Monitoring of oil spills. Finally, it should be added that during the last 
decade significant research activities have been observed in the technological upgrading of robotic inspection 
tools for offshore oil & gas facilities. All these topics will be addressed briefly in the following paragraphs. 
Annex III lists a considerable number of Oil Spill Prevention & Response Research Projects, including links to 
their web-sites. 
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7.2 In Situ Burning (ISB)  
 
Figure 7 1 In situ burning of crude oil collected in a fire resistant boom, Norway 2009 (Source: Arctic Council, 2015) [1] 
General description of the technique 
In situ burning (ISB) is the term used for controlled burning of oil in the original place and refers to a 
technique where accidentally spilled oil is ignited and burned directly on the water surface. It was used for the 
first time in 1958 during a pipeline spill in the Mackenzie River, Northwest Territories, Canada and since then 
several research activities and test burns have been conducted. Nowadays, it can be considered that ISB is a 
proven and environmentally acceptable response countermeasure technique with an overall removal rate 
ranging from 65 to over 90%. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (2001) stated that “The 
environmental advantages of in situ burning outweigh the potential environmental drawbacks of burn residue, 
including the possible environmental harm if the burn residue sinks’’. Among the three available response 
options, ISB is especially suited for use in the Arctic, where ice often provides a natural barrier to maintain the 
necessary oil thicknesses for ignition without the need for containment booms, and oil remains fresh and 
unemulsified for a longer period of time. [1] 
 
Advantages of ISB Disadvantages of ISB 
 
Rapid removal of large amounts of oil 
 
 
A large black smoke plume is created 
Reduced volume of oil requiring collection and 
disposal 
 
Burn residue sometimes requires collection and 
disposal 
 
High efficiency rates Risk of fire spreading  
 
Less equipment and labor required Oil on water must have at least 3 mm of thickness 
for the ignition & combustion to be successful. Oil 
usually must be contained to achieve this thickness 
Knowledge gaps - Recent research activities  
The Helitorch is an aerial ignition device which is hanged from or mounted on a helicopter to disperse ignited 
lumps of gelled gasoline. The Helitorch is a proven technology as it is used as an operational Arctic spill 
response tool from the mid-1990s. New Helitorch fuel formulations have already been developed in order to 
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demonstrate an increased ignitability of emulsified and hard -to- ignite oil spills.  Despite of the proven safety 
record, the Helitorch system still has some limitations as helicopters with sling loads have low speed, limited 
operational range and are susceptible to icing. Recent research activities focus on the development of new 
aerial ignition systems for Arctic offshore which do not require a sling load under a helicopter like fixed 
wing aircrafts. Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs – drones) are also being considered as possible ignition devices. 
[1] [2] 
Chemical herders are surfactants which are applied to the water surface around the edge of oil spills and 
cause the oil slicks to contract and thicken to ignitable thicknesses. They could be applied in ice-free waters or 
in waters with limited ice cover (0/10 to 6/10 ice cover). Generally, chemical herders have been available for 
several decades but they haven’t been used extensively to date as they are effective only under largely calm 
conditions. Furthermore, most of the available chemical herders demonstrate poor effectiveness in cold 
waters. Finally, it must be pointed out that currently, the best-known chemical herders are chemically stable 
and no biodegradable, and hence remain in the marine ecosystem for years. [1] [8] 
Recent research efforts have already introduced new types of cold – water chemical herder 
formulations which have proved their effectiveness in laboratory experiments and in small – scale 
experimental releases. Two types of cold - water chemical herders (ThickSlick 6535 and OP-40) are already 
commercially available. Nowadays, research is being conducted in order to expand the response window of 
the chemical herders by investigating new formulations and their effectiveness in a range of different type of 
crude oils which are submitted to different weathering conditions. Research is also performed in the 
identification of the environmental impacts of chemical herders in the Arctic seas and in the development of 
eco-friendly, biodegradable chemical herders from naturally occurring molecules that could meet the 
hallmarks of commerciality. [4] Finally, another area which gathers significant research efforts is the 
development of rapid and reliable response aerial systems, where fixed wing aircrafts or helicopters (manned 
or remotely controlled) could be used for aerial spraying of chemical herders. [3] [5] [6] [7] 
Significant research was also performed the last decade in order to improve the designs of fire resistant 
containment booms. Their operability and their effectiveness in broken ice conditions have been also 
investigated. Recent field tests have proved that it is feasible to use fire-resistant booms in light drift ice to 
collect oil and ice for In Situ Burning. The use of fire resistant booms is recommended for oil spills in open sea 
or in limited ice concentration (0/10 to 3/10 ice cover). [9] 
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7.3 Dispersants 
 
Figure 7 2 Biodegradation of spilled oil enhanced by aerial application of dispersants (Image Credit: Medscape) 
General description of the technique 
All commercially available chemical dispersants (e.g. Corexit 9500A or Corexit 9527A) are blends of 
surfactants in solvents. Surfactants reduce the surface tension at the oil / water interface enabling the two 
phases to mix. Solvents are needed to dissolve the surfactants so that the dispersants become liquids of 
uniform consistency and low viscosity. When dispersants are sprayed onto a sea surface oil slick then with the 
synergy of the wave energy, the lowered surface tension causes the oil spill to break up into small oil droplets 
(smaller than 100 μm). Subsequently, the subsurface currents dilute the small oil droplets in the water 
column where they are colonised and biodegraded by ‘oil eating’ bacteria naturally existing in the oceans. 
Generally, dispersants can be sprayed in the sea surface by vessels or aircrafts with dispersant to oil ratios of 
around 1:20 but lower ratios can be achieved in the case of direct subsea injection in a wellhead blowout.  
The effectiveness of the dispersants and the subsequent microbial degradation of oil droplets in Arctic 
environments has been verified by recent laboratory and field experiments. More specifically, lab tests 
conducted in 2007 by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported that greater than 80% of the 
alkanes of the dispersed Alaska North Slope (ANS) crude oil were biodegraded in 40 days. Similarly, lab tests 
conducted by the University of Alaska in 2014 reported chemical losses due to biodegradation of ANS crude 
oil ranging from 46% to 61% over 60 days. [17] [18] 
 
Advantages of Dispersants Disadvantages of Dispersants 
 
Indicated for very large oil spills 
 
 
Need for sufficient - accessible stockpiles 
Indicated to mitigate a wellhead blowout via subsea 
injection of dispersants 
Need for daylight and good weather conditions for 
aircrafts / vessels to operate 
 
Can be deployed rapidly by aircrafts Dispersed oil in shallow depths may involve toxicity 
dangers 
 
Can be effective in high sea states Dispersants are not effective in viscous oils 
 
Knowledge gaps - Recent research activities  
The technique of subsea injection of chemical dispersants was firstly applied in the Macondo Well Blowout 
during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (April 2010). Approximately 771.000 gallons of dispersants were 
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injected directly at the site of the wellhead using a remotely operating, underwater vehicle. The continuous 
injection of dispersants directly at the discharge point, under highly turbulent conditions proved to be very 
effective. Subsea injection may require 5 times less the volume of dispersants which is needed for surface 
operations with the same results. Furthermore, the technique provides operability under any weather 
conditions, presence of ice or long periods of darkness and minimizes human contact with the dispersants. 
Nevertheless, the optimization of the system design, the environmental impacts and the effectiveness of 
subsea injection of chemical dispersants in the presence of ice cover, could be considered as topics for future 
research. [15] 
As it was already mentioned, conventional dispersants demonstrate poor performance when applied in 
viscous oils. Recent research efforts conducted by ExxonMobil have already developed a new gel type 
dispersant with higher concentration of active ingredients which could be effective in oils currently 
considered too viscous either because of naturally high viscosity (e.g. IFO, HFO), or because of weathering, 
emulsification and cold temperatures. Furthermore, lab tests have proved that this new gel type dispersant 
results in a decreased toxicity of the dispersant –oil mixture due to reduced solvent concentrations. It could be 
used in light or medium crude oils as well, with dispersant to oil ratios (DOR) as low as 1:60 (compared to 
1:20 typically used for dispersants) which means that the load capacity of a plane could be tripled. [10] [11] 
Oil particles can interact with the particulate matter which is naturally found in suspension in the water 
column and form Oil-Mineral Aggregates (OMA). The formation of OMA stabilises oil droplets, prevents 
droplet coalescing and subsequently enhances the dispersion and biodegradation of oil in the water column. A 
new promising Oil Spill Response technique involves the increase of the rate OMA are formed by injecting clay 
mineral particles to the oil spill in conjunction with supplementary mixing energy from a propeller.  The 
efficacy of oil dispersion through promoting formation of OMA was field tested for the first time in 2008, in 
Canada, by spraying calcite mineral fines to an oil spill. Laboratory tests in field samples revealed that 60% 
of the Total Petroleum Hydro-carbons had been degraded after 56 days of incubation at 0,5oC. [16] 
As it was already mentioned, the mixing energy provided by the waves, promotes significantly dilution and 
dispersion of the oil droplets into the water column. Generally, the greater the mixing energy provided, the 
less dispersant is required. In Arctic areas where increased ice concentrations are encountered, waves are 
non-existent and supplementary mixing energy must be applied. Field tests have confirmed that the use of 
azimuthal-drive icebreakers can be very effective in providing the necessary turbulence. [17] 
Another key parameter for the successful implementation of the technique is the precise targeting of the oil 
spill so as not to waste dispersant. In the frames of the Joint Industry Programme on Oil Spill Recovery in Ice, 
an articulated spray arm was developed making it possible to provide accurate delivery of the dispersant, 
several meters from the side of the application ship. [17] 
Finally, a new developed and environmentally friendly technique, involves spraying sea water into an oil spill 
without any use of unnatural chemicals. Lab tests have shown that the injection of sea water under high 
pressure disperses an oil spill into smaller oil droplets than chemicals dispersants do, making biodegradation 
of oil faster. [21]  
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7.4 Mechanical Containment & Recovery (C&R) 
 
Figure 7 3 Skimmer deployed in icy water (Source: Pew Research Center) [22] 
General description of the technique 
Mechanical Containment & Recovery (C&R) is a three stage process. The first stage aims at limiting the 
spread of spilled oil in the sea surface, usually by containing the oil spill in a boom towed by vessels. In the 
Arctic seas, the presence of ice cover can also lead to natural containment of oil as it is illustrated in Figure 
7.3. The second stage of the process involves the recovery of the already contained oil from the sea surface 
by using a skimming or a direct suction device or a sorbent material. Finally, the last stage includes all the 
necessary actions for the offshore storage and the subsequent transfer, disposal or recycling of the recovered 
mix of oil and water.    
Mechanical Containment & Recovery (C&R) systems are strongly relied on supportive coastal infrastructure. 
Furthermore, they are characterised by very low oil encounter and recovery rates which are largely 
exacerbated by the presence of ice. As a consequence, this technique can have only a supplementary role in 
the mitigation of large oil spills but can be more effective in small to medium sized spills. Indicatively, in the 
Macondo spill (2010), Mechanical C&R systems accounted for only 2-4% of the total 780.000 m3 of 
discharged oil, whereas in the Godafoss incident (2011) where only 112 m3 of oil were released, the 
technique managed to recover around 50% of the discharged volume. [1] 
 
Advantages of Mechanical C&R Disadvantages of Mechanical C&R 
 
Indicated for small oil spills 
 
 
Slow process with low oil recovery rates. Insufficient 
to respond to large oil spills 
 
Indicated for shallow or biologically productive 
waters 
Need for offshore & coastal infrastructure like 
storage, disposal and recycling facilities 
 
 Ineffective in high sea states 
 
 Ineffective in the presence of ice 
Knowledge gaps - Recent research activities  
The technological level of Mechanical Containment & Recovery (C&R) systems could be characterised as 
rather mature. Their effectiveness is limited by the fundamental constrain of Encounter Rate which refers to 
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the amount of oil that comes into contact with the recovery device. As a consequence, any further 
technological improvement is expected to be incremental and have little effect on the overall effectiveness. 
Over the last decades, continuous research is being conducted to develop new vessel design concepts that 
could increase oil spill response capability in ice covered waters. Multipurpose, ice strengthened vessels with 
special features like azimuth driving, advanced oil spill detection systems and increased storage capacity for 
the recovered oil and the necessary mechanical equipment have been constructed. The state of the art should 
include the following oil spill response vessels: Aker ARC 131 (Finland), Louhi (Finland), Multipurpose Vessel 
8116 (Sweden), Andrey Vilkitsky (Russia), Polaris (Finland), Gennadiy Nevelskoy (Russia), Esvagt Aurora 
(Denmark), Stril Barents (Norway) and Baltika (Russia).  
As it is already mentioned, the main drawback of all mechanical Containment & Recovery systems is their low 
Encounter Rate making them insufficient for big, rapidly spreading oil spills. Spilled oil may spread faster in 
the sea surface than it can be contained and recovered by mechanical devices. With existent technology, 
conventional containment booms can be towed in open water, at speeds around one knot since higher speeds 
could result in loss of oil under the boom. Recent research activities have developed innovative designs of ice 
boom systems which promise successful containment of oil at speeds up to three knots. Generally, ice booms 
are more reinforced than conventional booms in order to withstand the strains of ice being captured within 
the towed boom systems. [19]  
Another limiting factor of all mechanical C&R systems is that they become extremely ineffective even in 
small ice concentrations as ice interferes with boom operation. The pneumatic boom is a new small – scale, 
mechanical containment device that has been developed recently and involves the release of air bubbles 
through a perforated grate which is submerged in a depth of a couple of metres beneath an oil spill. Field 
tests have shown that the generated curtain of air bubbles can limit effectively the spread of an oil spill even 
in areas of strong currents. Another approach is the recently developed foam filled oil boom which has also 
demonstrated good performance in ice covered waters as it can be easily inserted between cracked ice blocks 
to contain an oil spill. [20] [23] 
Significant research has also been conducted to develop reliable ice management systems which are 
absolutely necessary for deflecting ice and making oil volumes accessible for recovery. Generally, there are 
three different approaches for separating oil from ice with the latest two to gather the biggest perspectives 
for field applications: [19] 
Oil contaminated ice can be lifted from the water surface to be processed on board. An example of the above 
technique is the MORICE prototype unit. 
Oil contaminated ice can be submerged. Buoyancy separates naturally oil which floats up to the surface. The 
OilWhale prototype, the LORI Ice Cleaner and the Lamor Oil Ice Separator (LOIS) are innovative systems which 
follow this principle.  
Oil contaminated ice can be cleaned at the water surface. Examples of this approach are the Lamor Arctic 
Skimmer (LAS) and the Lamor Sternmax, the world’s largest skimmer which is deployed at the stern of the 
response vessel. 
The backbone of all mechanical recovery operations is the skimming unit. Recent research activities have 
developed innovative skimming systems in order to increase their resistance to arctic conditions and their 
capability to handle cold viscous oils and mixtures of oil and ice. Skimmers capable of independent propulsion 
have also been developed which allow remote recovery of oil that is not accessible by the mother ship. An 
example of self-propelled skimmer is the Framo Polaris Skimmer. Generally, for ice – covered waters two 
types of skimmers are recommended, the rope mop (oleophilic) skimmers and the brush skimmers. Innovative 
skimming systems that should be mentioned are the Desmi Helix skimmer, the Desmi Polar Bear skimmer, the 
Lamor Oil Recovery Bucket (LRB) and the Hendriksen FoxTail rope skimmer. [19] 
Area of recent research activities has also been the development of on board concepts for separation of the 
recovered fluids (oil, water, ice) and for incineration of the recovered oil. Till today there is no proven 
technology for on-board separation of the recovered fluids fast enough, to maintain reasonable response 
operations.  Concerning the development of on board combustion systems of the recovered oil there are three 
main concepts which are still under development: The Pneumatic Flare, the Rotary Cup Burner and the 
Augmented Burner concept. [19] 
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7.5 Selection of Oil Spill Response Strategy 
The selection of the appropriate response strategy to deal with an oil spill in Arctic, includes the identification 
of the appropriate response technique which is going to be used, along with the level of intensity and the 
duration of its implementation. The weathering and the movement of spilled oil in the sea surface, gives a 
dynamic nature to oil spills which usually leads to the simultaneous implementation of various OSR 
techniques that complement each other. The selection of the appropriate response strategy is determined by 
the following parameters: 
 Type and quantity of spilled oil; 
 Environmental resources and habitats threatened; 
 Local weather, sea state and presence of ice; 
 Proximity to supportive infrastructure. 
The most comprehensive approach to define the appropriate response strategy for a particular oil spill is the 
Net Environmental Benefit Analysis. NEBA is a decision making process which assesses the long-term effects 
on an ecosystem in order to ensure that the selected response strategy leads to the best overall minimization 
of environmental damage. NEBA is performed during the planning stage and it includes a range of potential 
oil spill scenarios in order to reduce the time it would take for decision making during a real oil spill where 
decisions are taken rapidly. In order to strengthen the NEBA approach in Arctic operations, significant research 
is being conducted in the following topics: [24] 
 Arctic ecosystem and valuable resources; 
 Transport and fate of oil spills in the Arctic marine environment;  
 Environmental impacts of every Oil Spill Response technology; 
 Biodegradation of oil in the Arctic marine environment; 
 Ecotoxicology of oil and treated oil;  
 Population effects modelling; 
 Ecosystem recovery. 
 
7.6 Detection & Monitoring of Oil Spills 
 
Figure 7 4 Surveillance tools that may be used in a response operation (Source: IOGP – Report 549) [25] 
General description of the technique 
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The successful implementation of any OSR strategy is relied on the timely detection and accurate monitoring 
of the oil spill as it expands in the sea surface. Detection & monitoring of oil spills in the Arctic waters has 
many particularities and even today is considered as a technological challenge. The lack of waves due to the 
presence of ice impedes the use of any conventional marine or satellite radar system. In addition, long periods 
of darkness, high wind speeds and cloud cover, decrease significantly the operability of current airborne 
detection & monitoring systems.  Potential oil spills in Arctic are required to be detected in various ice 
conditions: on, under or encapsulated within the sea ice, between ice floes or buried under snow. In all the 
aforementioned parameters, it should be added that natural weathering of oil influences negatively its 
detectability by the remote sensing systems. From all the above, it becomes obvious that advanced detection 
& monitoring systems need to be developed for the special Arctic conditions, capable to provide an accurate 
and real time image of the oil spill to the response personnel. 
Knowledge gaps - Recent research activities  
Over the last decade, significant advances in the field of remote sensing and surveillance have been recorded. 
The research activity is expected to continue in the following years and lead to the development of new 
sensor technologies and deployment platforms. Figure 7.5 illustrates a distribution of peer – reviewed papers 
related to remote sensing that were published between the years 2000 and 2012. After a global search, 75 
relative papers were identified and they were classified according to the type of platform each sensor is 
integrated to. It is obvious that most research activities are oriented towards sensors mounted from satellite 
platforms. [26]   
 
Figure 7 5 Distribution of peer reviewed remote sensing papers per used platform (Source: API – Report 1144) [26] 
The current state of the art for oil spill detection technologies in ice covered waters is illustrated in Table 7.1 
where the performance of the commercially available combinations of platforms and sensors are evaluated 
for every possible oil-in-ice distribution. In cases where the sensors have proved their performance and can be 
considered as reliable for the specific oil in ice distribution, Green colour is used as indication. Red colour is 
used where technological limitations that cannot be overcome, make oil spill detection improbable. Finally, in 
cases where a sensor's performance is not yet proved but there are possibilities of successful 
implementation, the Orange indication is used. Consequently, the Orange areas in the Table could be 
characterized as areas of scientific interest where further research needs to be conducted. [27]   
Emerging trends in the area of remote sensing involve the development of data fusion algorithms that will 
enable multi sensor integration to the surveillance systems. Generally, multiple data streams can lead to 
more comprehensive datasets and more accurate depictions of the oil spills.  The need for multi sensor 
integration is also depicted in Table 7.1 where it becomes obvious that in order to detect oil spills in all the 
possible oil in ice distributions encountered in the Arctic seas, data streams from multiple sensors are 
required.  
As it is already mentioned, the research activity in remote sensing systems for oil spill detection is focused 
mostly on satellite sensors. This is attributed to the fact that active microwave sensors mounted on satellites 
can cover quickly wide areas without being affected by weather conditions, cloud cover or absence of sunlight.  
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is the most applicable space born sensor and its performance in detecting oil 
spills in open water and in very open drift ice (till 3/10 ice concentration) can be considered as proven. 
Nevertheless, SAR's detection capability is hindered in ice concentrations higher than 4/10ths as both oil and 
newly formed thin sea ice have the same SAR signature resulting in false positives. Research efforts in 
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progress, investigate the use of multi-polarization SAR systems in order to discriminate oil spills from 
newly formed sea ice and expand the operating range of satellite sensors. [28]   
Another very promising area of research in satellite remote sensing is the development of classification 
algorithms that will allow automatic, real time detection and continuous monitoring of an oil spill. Automatic 
detection of oil spills is of fundamental importance for responding to unknown - accidental incidents or 
illegal discharges. Several innovative techniques are under development. A recently developed approach 
based on the Robust Satellite Technique (RST) involves the combination of data acquired from optical sensors 
mounted on meteorological satellites with radar acquisitions from SAR systems resulting in a multiplatform 
system. [29]   
Nowadays, detection of oil spills under or within sea ice, remains a technological challenge beyond the 
technological capabilities of airborne and space-borne sensors. There are few available technologies, which 
can be applied on or near ice, the most promising of which is the Ground Penetrating Radar. GPR is a 
surface carried unit which emits electromagnetic pulses in the microwave region (500 MHz to 1 GHz). By 
analysing the collected reflection signal, information can be obtained about the structure of the subsurface.  
The technique is based on the fact that the dielectric permittivity ratio between sea ice and sea water is much 
larger than the corresponding ratio between sea ice and oil resulting to different reflected signals. Generally, 
the range of GPR systems is very short, and their detection capabilities are limited to oil spills which are 
thicker than 2 cm and located in a maximum depth of 210 cm below ice. The most important drawback of the 
technique is the need of personnel on ice to operate the device which arises safety issues and makes the 
process time consuming. To address the above issue, the operability of a GPR system mounted from a low 
flying helicopter is being investigated after some encouraging experimental tests. Another weak point of the 
technique is the fact that variations in the snow and ice structure may result in the same reflection signals as 
with oil spills resulting in false positives. Therefore, recent research activities aim to the development of semi 
– automated classification algorithms which will improve the reliability of GPR systems. [30]   
Detection of oil spills located under or within sea ice is being investigated through other helicopter - mounted 
sensors which are still not commercially available. The Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) 
radar is a recently designed prototype, which has demonstrated several benefits over the pulse type radars 
(GPR). It should be referred that both GPR and FMCW radar systems are unlikely to provide reliable detection 
of oil in or under ice once the internal temperatures are close to the melting point. In the same context, a full 
scale Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) prototype has recently (2016) undergone a feasibility testing 
and proved ability to detect an oil spill 1 cm thick located in a depth of 110 cm below the simulated ice. [31] 
[32]   
Undersea robots consist an attractive approach for detecting oil spills located under or within sea ice as 
they can operate independently of weather conditions and without the need of personnel on ice. There are two 
types of underwater robots: Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) which are controlled from the surface over a 
tether and Autonomous Operated Vehicles (AOVs). ROVs are considered a reliable, mature technology but the 
tether limits their range and a vessel is always required to support their operation. From the other hand, AOVs 
can cover much larger search areas making them more suitable for big oil spills and they can be launched 
from the shore or from a helicopter. Recent research activities have focused on the advancement of AOVs 
under ice capabilities as their range is limited by their battery capacity and the absence of a tether 
complicates accurate navigation and real time data rates. A recently developed Long Range AUV prototype 
has demonstrated capability to rove for 15 days continuously without recharging batteries, covering in total 
373 miles. The AOVs’ sensor suite performance is also an area of research. Recent experiments have 
demonstrated the ability of a multi sensor system which is consisted of digital cameras, a laser fluorosensor 
and a high-frequency narrowband sonar to detect oil efissiently under various sea ice conditions, or 
encapsulated within the ice to a thickness of up to 15 cm. [33] [34]   
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Table 7 1 Remote Sensing Capabilities versus Oil in Ice Distribution Categories (Source: Arctic Oil Spill Response Technology, 2016) 
 
 
Platforms / Sensors 
 
 
Oil in ice Distibution 
Stable Ice Surface AUV / ROV Offshore Platform / Vessel 
/ Aerostat 
Airctaft / UAV Satellite 
VIS / 
OPT 
TIR GPR OPT LFS Sonar VIS / 
OPT 
TIR / 
FLIR 
Marine 
Radar 
VIS / 
OPT 
TIR / 
FLIR 
UV LFS / 
LIDAR 
SLAR GPR SAR 
Oil on water with ice 
Oil falling on slush ice     P P Y Y N Y Y N Y N  N 
Oil rising below slush ice    P P P P P N P P N P N  N 
1/10 - 3/10 ice 
concentration 
      Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 
4/10 - 6/10 ice 
concentration 
      Y Y P Y Y Y P P  P 
7/10 - 9/10 ice 
concentration 
P P     Y Y N Y Y N P N  N 
Oil on ice 
Exposed on solid ice surface Y Y        Y Y N Y N  N 
Under snow cover P N Y       N N N N N Y N 
Exposed in spring melt 
pools 
Y Y        Y Y P N N  N 
Oil under / in ice 
Smooth ice P  Y Y Y Y        N P N 
Deformed ice   N P P         N N N 
Encapsulated layer P  Y P P         N P N 
Disperced vertical migration   P P N         N P N 
 
Abbreviations  
 
AUV Autonomous Underwater Vehicle  VIS Visual Observation Expected Performance 
FLIR Forward-looking infrared sensor UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle   
GPR Ground Penetrating Radar UV Airborne Ultraviolet reflectance scanner Y Yes (likely) 
LFS Laser fluorosensor ROV Remotely Operated (underwater) Vehicle P Potential (may be possible) 
LIDAR Light detecting and ranging system SAR Synthetic  Aperture Radar N No (not likely) 
OPT High definition cameras SLAR Side – Looking Airborne Radar  Not applicable 
TIR Thermal Infrared Sensor     
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8 Questionnaire on safety aspects for offshore Oil & Gas operations in the 
Arctic 
The authors of this report have prepared a questionnaire for oil and gas companies operating in the Arctic in 
order to gather information from the offshore industry on the state of the art of safety measures and 
emergency response in case of accident and the particular precautions that are taken into consideration when 
operating in the Arctic and sub-Arctic environments.  
The seven questions included in the survey are reported below. The authors thank the Arctic Committee of the 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) for the help offered in distributing the questionnaire 
to the individual companies and the subsequent collection of their replies. The compiled answers are 
presented in this chapter.  
1. How does your safety management system for activity in an Arctic/sub-Arctic environment differ from 
that in more benign areas? 
 
2. How do you assess physical and psychological suitability of personnel for additional challenges of work in 
an Arctic/Sub-Arctic environment? Please list any specific additional psycho-physical requirements. 
 
3. What are the additional challenges associated with emergency response in Arctic/sub-Arctic, and how do 
you address these challenges in your emergency response planning? Examples of emergency response 
plans are welcomed. 
 
4. How do you mitigate risk to personnel in case of Arctic/sub-Arctic environmental conditions which hinder 
safe evacuation and rescue? 
 
5. How do you plan for oil spill response in areas with ice compared to open water? What different or 
additional tools and procedures do you use? 
 
6. How do you learn from incidents or near misses, particularly in Arctic / sub-Arctic waters?  What tools do 
you use for sharing and learning? Specific examples of learning from events are welcomed. 
 
7. Do you have any ongoing initiatives relating to improving safety of operation of activities in Arctic / sub-
Arctic waters? Information on initiatives is welcomed. 
 
QUESTION 1: How does your safety management system for activity in an Arctic/sub-Arctic 
environment differ from that in more benign areas? 
The oil and gas industry uses comprehensive management systems and processes to avoid incidents that 
could negatively impact health, safety or the environment. These systems are in place to manage risks so that 
all onshore and offshore facilities are operated in a safe, reliable and responsible manner. Elements of the 
safety management system include: commitment and accountability; policies, standards and objectives; 
organizational planning and procedures; risk management; asset design and integrity; monitoring, reporting 
and learning; assurance review; and, continuous improvement. These generic aspects are applicable for 
activities worldwide, whilst driving focus to manage location and operation specific challenges.  
The specific conditions associated with operations in a given Arctic location provide context and inputs to 
ensure a fit-for-purpose and effective risk management program. The very broad spread of operational and 
environmental conditions across the Arctic, is well suited to a safety management system approach that 
allows tailored safety management for actual activities and local challenges whilst drawing on available 
knowledge and best practices.  
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For a specific Arctic project, challenges to be managed can include presence of sea ice, icebergs, cold 
temperatures, operational remoteness, periods of full darkness and light, and ecological and social 
sensitivities. These are addressed through competent and trained staff, corporate guidelines and standards, 
Arctic specific guidelines and standards, non-Arctic specific guidelines and standards having Arctic 
applicability and supported by scientific data. As in all frontier areas where industry operates, uncertainty is 
addressed through prudent design practice and operational mitigations, and all identified risks are mitigated 
to meet local rules and regulations and to ensure the risk is “As Low As Reasonably Practicable”, as per the 
ALARP principle.  
Overall, a strong safety management system is equally applicable in the Arctic as in other regions and 
companies generally apply the same system across all locations. However, as delivery of a safety 
management system for Arctic areas is based on a thorough risk-based approach, this relies on having 
competent resources, including experienced Arctic specialists, who can identify, assess and mitigate the risks. 
Arctic specific requirements are not necessary, but companies may choose to reference appropriate good 
practices that are built up based on accumulated experience.  
Additional notes  
Asset integrity is managed via a disciplined risk management process including risk identification, risk analysis 
and assessment, risk review and control. Industry risk management process is based on ISO 31000: 2018, 
Risk management – Principles and guidelines, which is tailored to the Arctic through context setting and by 
site specific parameters including intended activity, location, time and activity duration, environmental 
conditions, social considerations, supporting capability such as assets and people and supporting scientific 
data.  
The international oil and gas industry develops recognized technical standards which are used worldwide. 
Accumulated experience of the industry is continually included in these standards through systematic 
updating and issuance of new revisions. Recognized technical standards are normally valid also for use in cold 
climate areas, i.e. Arctic specific standards are generally not required but should be covered by the functional 
requirements of global standard. Functional standards are important as Arctic projects are typically highly 
tailored and location specific, and prescriptive “standardization” can introduce new risks and/or limit 
innovation. Most regulatory regimes encourage the use of new technology to enhance safety; and provide 
controls to ensure that any risks with the introduction of the new technology are fully managed  
In some cases, Arctic specific standards and good practices have been identified as appropriate from 
developed experience, including e.g. ISO 19906: Petroleum and natural gas industries - Arctic offshore 
structures, OGP Reports, IACs Polar Class and individual Class Society codes. Selected new ISO standards have 
been developed where identified as priorities in the industry-government Barents 2020 study. These 
standards are soon complete.  
The issue of standardization is often misunderstood, misused or – in some cases - mixed up with the role of 
regulations. Standards are developed by industry experts to represent consensus of proven best practices to 
provide reliable outcomes. Standards are voluntary. In cases where stakeholders are skeptical to industry 
ability or performance in the Arctic as an unfamiliar region, and wish to see mandatory requirements 
enforced, then that is the role of regulations. Regulations are mandatory and do not require consensus.  
 
Question 2: How do you assess physical and psychological suitability of personnel for additional 
challenges of work in an Arctic/Sub-Arctic environment? Please list any specific additional 
psycho-physical requirements.  
Companies in general have standardized requirements for working offshore. Given the significant variability in 
location and activities within the Arctic and sub-Arctic, the need for tailored requirements will be assessed on 
a project or activity specific basis according to the local environmental conditions.  
The specific personnel safety challenges in the Arctic during routine operations are often related to the 
physical and psychological effects of cold and darkness. Industry guidelines regarding additional assessment 
of suitability for cold climate are available, e.g. IPIECA, IOGP, ISO.  
As an example, Shell requires that special training and information is normally provided for all personnel 
travelling offshore to Arctic/Sub-Arctic environments and also requires HAZWOPER certification and additional 
training for responders expected to work in cold weather conditions. Several training courses for field 
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personnel have been developed, such as the OSRL Extreme Cold Weather Spill Response Course to prepare 
responders and let them practice in controlled environment. 
Fitness to Work took on an added dimension of importance during our operations in the Arctic. It was 
necessary to involve medical professionals (doctors, PA, and nurses) who had cold weather and Arctic 
experience to help assess the people involved in Arctic operations.  
Personnel expected to fly on helicopters offshore must have current Arctic/Cold weather HUET training to 
ensure they are prepared to emergency evacuation in this climate.  
For further details, please refer to: 
 ISO 15743:2008 Ergonomics of the thermal environment -Cold workplaces 
 ISO 35101:2017 Petroleum and natural gas industries -- Arctic operations -- Working environment  
 IOGP Report 398 Health aspects of work in extreme climates 
 IOGP Report 447 HSE guidelines for metocean surveys including Arctic areas 
And also: 
 ISO 12894: 2001 Ergonomics of the thermal environment 
 NORSOK S-002 (2018): Working Environment 
Industry has contributed significantly to develop ISO 35101:2017 and NORSOK S-002 (2018) over the past 
several years, and requirements of these standards are based around a large collective of research 
knowledge as well as many years of experience.  ISO 35101 was developed as a specific recommendation of 
the Barents 2020 report and includes e.g. psychosocial stress etc. So these are the key standards that I 
recommend you read, supported by the various IOGP guidelines etc. 
Generally, companies will specify the standards / embed requirements for use via internal specifications etc. 
IOGP would expect that risk processes would pick up any project specific factors that should be a requirement. 
To support continuous improvement, companies also undertake research activities to follow up specific needs 
or niche requirements. IOGP has undertaken a number of reports over several years which include various 
aspects of cold working, including psycho-social, and so the relevant learning is captured into standards. 
 
Question 3: What are the additional challenges associated with emergency response in Arctic/sub-
Arctic, and how do you address these challenges in your emergency response planning? Examples 
of emergency response plans are welcomed.  
Specific Arctic challenges will vary by region, but could be related to presence of sea ice, icebergs, cold 
temperatures, icing, operational remoteness, periods of full darkness and light, and ecological and social 
sensitivities. These factors could potentially cause or exacerbate the consequences of incidents, e.g. 
ice/iceberg causes structural damage, cold water reduces survival time for personnel exposure. The primary 
focus of industry is to prevent incidents by accounting for these conditions in safe design and operations. 
However, Arctic stakeholders are also prepared with comprehensive plans to mitigate consequences to life 
and the environment in case an accident occurs.  
Accounting for “Arctic” factors in emergency response can introduce additional considerations in solutions 
compared to similar operations in other regions. In general, actual needs are identified through a disciplined 
use of risk management practices that consider detailed specifics of the region and activity in order to provide 
a robust response strategy, whilst allowing for technology innovation. ISO 19906 provides additional design 
information that reflects current best practices accumulated for the Arctic. Whilst Barents 2020 judged ISO 
19906 to provide appropriate guidance for EER operations for Arctic Conditions; it also identified an 
opportunity to enhance the standard. This is being addressed under ISO DIS 35102. Overall, the general view 
is that it is important to have deep involvement of experts with knowledge of Arctic environment, challenges 
and technologies.  
Logistics challenges of operating in remote areas may be based around existing facilities in the region, or 
emergency response resources must be brought where needed. In addition to well-recognized emergency 
response resources, it is important to check sufficient connectivity and redundant communications e.g. 
satellite and aerial monitoring, advanced communications networks to support SAR, medical 
evaluation/evacuation, oil spill monitoring and response etc. 
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Question 4: How do you mitigate risk to personnel in case of Arctic/sub-Arctic environmental 
conditions which hinder safe evacuation and rescue?  
Arctic stakeholders mitigate risk in the first incidence by prevention of incidents, and multiple barriers that are 
in place to avoid the need for personnel to evacuate in an emergency. By applying the risk based 
methodology, they work to identify the situations where ensuring safe emergency evacuation and rescue may 
be appropriate, and to establish the effectiveness of methods in potential conditions. Effective evacuation and 
rescue relates to being able to leave the installation and move to a safe distance, and to survive until rescue 
to a safe haven is completed.  
With respect to the local challenges that could be present at an Arctic or sub-Arctic location, there has been 
technology development regarding potential EER technologies e.g. evacuation bridges to supply vessels, ice 
strengthened winterized lifeboats, special craft for operations in / on ice, PPE for cold environment survival, 
personnel location equipment. In some locations (e.g. Norwegian and Barents Sea), relatively standard EER 
solutions can work throughout the year or part of the year. In other locations e.g. (Chukchi Sea, North Caspian 
Sea) the variability of environmental conditions from summer to winter may mean that there is no single 
evacuation method suitable for abandonment in all credible incident scenarios. Until year round solutions are 
developed, then a suite of different evacuation facilities may be necessary to cover seasonal operating 
environments.  
It is important to remember that risk mitigation may also be through operating philosophy, i.e. Arctic 
stakeholders do not operate if they cannot provide safe and reliable evacuation. Consistent with offshore 
operations in other remote or harsh regions, if they identify potential conditions where evacuation cannot be 
safely performed, then the management system will require precautionary shutdown and down-manning of 
the facility. This thereby avoids the need for emergency evacuation in unsuitable environmental conditions. 
There are numerous examples of precautionary evacuation.  
Generally they consider that approaches used for the offshore industry in remote and cold regions may be 
transferable to tourism and merchant maritime industries who increasingly operate in these areas. 
 
Question 5: How do you plan for oil spill response in areas with ice compared to open water? What 
different or additional tools and procedures do you use?  
The oil and gas industry is committed to operating safely and responsibly in environmental and social terms. 
Prevention of oil spills from occurring is the top priority to manage risk. Prevention is based on identifying 
initiators and causes of hazards that could lead to a spill, and a disciplined use of reliable and redundant 
controls and barriers that manage or avoid hazards, to ensure a very low likelihood of a spill occurring. For 
example, primary controls and barriers to prevent well control incidents while drilling include well design, use 
of trained competent personnel to construct the well, and remote monitoring of critical well parameters by 
well control experts. For drilling, a secondary barrier would be provided by the Blowout Preventer (BOP). In the 
unlikely event that these primary and secondary barriers fail, the use of a Capping Stack or Subsea Isolation 
Device would provide further controls stopping or limiting spills.  
While risk is most effectively managed by prevention, industry is continually improving spill response 
capabilities as a key priority to mitigate risk even further. The overall goal of oil spill response (OSR) is to 
minimize the potential damage caused by an accidental release and employ the most effective response tools 
for a given incident in the unlikely event that all preventative barriers and controls fail. Preparedness is 
important in order to ensure that appropriate plans, people and equipment are in place and available. Giving 
responders the flexibility to apply the most effective “tools in the toolbox” to suit the prevailing conditions is 
the key to mounting a successful response and minimizing impacts.  
The breadth of environmental conditions across the Arctic means that it is important that response 
preparedness plans are carefully tuned to be specific to the actual activity and location. The choice of 
response options can vary greatly depending on e.g. the source of the spill, location, timing, ice conditions, ice 
season duration, environmental sensitivities and oil properties. An appropriate toolbox of latest technologies 
must be available for the potential conditions in which a spill might occur, and the response team must have 
full flexibility to apply these. In this respect, industry invests in research and development for continuous 
improvement, develops and maintains various best practices and guidelines, and supports local clean seas 
organizations to that are trained and updated to provide the best available emergency response planning and 
execution. There are currently initiatives within IPIECA and IOGP to summarize Arctic specific OSRP 
considerations and to map tools and resources to make these more clearly available to other interested 
parties.  
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There is a wealth of more detailed technical information on assessment, tools and methods available within 
the “toolbox”. Some specific points are noted below. 
  A sub-sea capping system can be installed at the sea floor in the event of a loss of well control and 
in the event of BOP failure. It can be operated in open water, or in some ice concentrations with 
additional ice management.  
 Presence of ice can pose a challenge for spill response, however experience has shown, that low 
temperatures and ice also can enhance spill response and reduce environmental impacts under 
certain conditions. For example:  
a. Low air and water temperatures generally lead to greater oil equilibrium thicknesses that 
result in reduced spreading rates and smaller contaminated area. These beneficial effects 
greatly reduce the potential for direct oil impact with natural resources while providing an 
opportunity for much higher oil encounter/removal rates using mechanical recovery and 
burning operations.  
b. Evaporation rates are reduced in cold temperatures and ice. As a result, the lighter and more 
volatile components remain for a longer time, thereby enhancing the ease with which the oil 
can be burned on water in controlled fashion. 
c. When ice concentrations preclude the use of booms, the ice serves as a natural barrier to the 
spread of oil and help concentrate the oil for recovery with stationary skimmers dipped into 
discrete pockets of oil. The natural containment of oil against ice edges leads to thicker oil 
films that enhance the effectiveness of burning.  
d. Oil that was released under stationary ice will rapidly become immobilized and encapsulated 
within the ice. This oil is then effectively isolated from any direct contact with biological 
resources (marine or bird life).  
e. Oil encapsulated within the ice is also isolated from any weathering processes (evaporation, 
dispersion, emulsification). The fresh condition of the oil when exposed (e.g., through ice 
management or natural melt processes) enhances the chances for effective combustion and 
dispersion.  
f. Landfast ice protects shorelines from the oil spilled offshore during freezing season and 
allows recovery or burning at its edge rather than on the shoreline as it would be in other 
regions.  
g. Oil spilled on frozen ground and in snow doesn’t spread to uncontaminated areas and doesn’t 
penetrate soil. It can be safely removed when safe to do so. 
Numerous responses, experiments and field tests demonstrated that all 3 response options (mechanical 
recovery, in-situ burning and dispersants use) can work effectively in Arctic and ice-covered waters. In some 
cases, they can be more effective in Arctic than in temperate regions.  
There is ongoing work across regions to operationalize methods, as well as testing of innovative solutions (e.g. 
pyrodrones for remote ignition). Exercises are an important part of preparedness for equipment, personnel 
and procedures. These activities are often beneficially undertaken collaboratively through national Clean Seas 
organizations funded by the industry, e.g. Norwegian Clean Seas Association https://www.nofo.no/en/ 
 
Question 6: How do you learn from incidents or near misses, particularly in Arctic / sub-Arctic 
waters? What tools do you use for sharing and learning? Specific examples of learning from 
events are welcomed.  
There are many conferences on the Arctic, the majority of which are commercial (for money) and have limited 
value. The most relevant ones are those from technical organisations such as SPE, OTC/ATC, ISOPE, POAC etc. 
Many of these include very detailed assessment of technical factors related to safety of operations. 
Arctic Stakeholders learn from ALL incidents, noting that many of the incidents that occur in the Arctic are 
caused by non-Arctic factors. The rather surface level of analysis found in newspaper reports and 
commercially available incident databases do not give deep assessment of causes. 
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National regulators all maintain their own general databases of incidents, as do trade orgs e.g. NOROG, 
IOGP.  Key / urgent learnings will be communicated through regulators and industry organizations, and these 
are directed towards the relevant subject experts or responsible company personnel to deal with them. 
Standards will then be updated to address the issue. In most Western countries (e.g. UK and Norway) and 
some companies (e.g. Equinor) there is very strong culture for reporting and learning, but it’s not global across 
all countries and companies. There are always opportunities to build safety cultures that recognize the value 
and benefit from reporting, rather than to fear punishment. (This is a global need across many industries so 
not Arctic or O&G specific.) 
In addition, it must be noted that Arctic specific incidents will provide discussion into the trade organization 
fora e.g. IOGP, NOROG, CAPP, API (these last 3 are members of IOGP), and into the International Regulators 
Forum (IRF), and Arctic Offshore Regulators Forum (AORF). These organizations can then raise the need for 
regulations, guidelines, standards or notices etc. to address the issue. 
Looking at Norway’s PSA as an example: all investigation reports are openly available to everyone as are 
audit reports. These provide useful information regarding both lessons learned (investigations) and issues to 
be aware of in prevention of incidents (audits). The website is searchable to find audit and investigation 
reports, enforcement notices etc such as in: http://www.ptil.no/about-supervision/category888.html.  The 
Norwegian PSA has its own Safety Forum http://www.ptil.no/safety-forum/category917.html  and Regulatory 
forum http://www.ptil.no/regulations/regulatory-forum-article9524-216.html . Other countries have similar. 
 
Question 7: Do you have any ongoing initiatives relating to improving safety of operation of 
activities in Arctic / sub- Arctic waters? Information on initiatives is welcomed. 
Learning from incidents is an important part of company safety management at top level. The systems apply 
irrespective of where or what environment in which an incident or near miss occurred. Some companies have 
identified benefit in requiring that teams understood challenges and learnings from previous Arctic incidents 
as part of preparation and risk assessments for future operations.  
Two companies have identified learning related to seabed topography in the Arctic. In some cases (Pacific and 
Bering Strait) the seabed is constantly changing, particularly in shallow waters. In others (Atlantic Greenland), 
real measurements in areas of sparse data have shown that conventional maps may be unreliable.  
A recent learning related to iceberg management at the Sea Rose field offshore Newfoundland can be found 
at https://www.cnlopb.ca/wp-content/uploads/iceier.pdf  
It has to be noted that some incidents that occurred in the Arctic are not related to Arctic environment specific 
issues, but e.g. maritime issues for transit of rigs, safety management for dropped objects. 
* * * 
At the light of the answers published above, Oil & Gas companies apply equally a strong Safety Management 
System (SMS) in the Arctic as in the other regions. There is not a specific mandatory regulatory regime for oil 
and gas operators in Arctic areas but companies follow optionally, standards and good practices built up on 
their accumulated experience. Up today, the most comprehensive study in Arctic specific standards was 
conducted via the Barents 2020 project which resulted in Phase 3 report (2010) and Phase 4 report (2012): 
https://www.dnvgl.com/oilgas/arctic/barents-2020-reports.html 
Furthermore, Oil & Gas companies have standardized physical and psychological requirements for all the 
personnel working offshore and apply additional, project - tailored training for those involved in operations in 
Arctic / sub-Arctic environments. Some indicative training requirements for personnel of Oil & Gas industry 
who is exposed to offshore, Arctic environments, are presented below: 
 HUET - Helicopter Underwater Escape Training; 
 HAZWOPER - Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Training; 
 OSRL - Extreme Cold Weather Spill Response Course. 
As previously stated, offshore operations in Arctic waters are more challenging than in less harsh 
environments due to ecological and social sensitiveness, prolonged periods of darkness (winter) and light 
(summer), operational remoteness, cold ambient air temperatures, dense fog, cold water temperatures, sea 
ice in varying concentrations and thickness, and icebergs. These Arctic factors result in a shorter "window" for 
emergency response. Similar conditions are also present in other sub-Arctic regions e.g. Sea of Okhotsk, North 
Caspian Sea. The overall Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) system design and operational aspects for 
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offshore installations in Arctic areas is being addressed under ISO/DIS 35102 which is still under 
development. https://www.iso.org/standard/75741.html 
Risk mitigation concerning safe evacuation and rescue of personnel operating offshore in Arctic areas is 
ensured at first degree via a risk based approach for prevention of any possible incidents and at second 
degree, via development of suitable EER technologies. In cases where safe evacuation and rescue cannot be 
ensured due to remoteness or harsh environmental conditions then precautionary shutdown of the facility is 
imposed. 
Finally, it has been proved that all of the 3 available Oil Spill Response (OSR) techniques (mechanical 
recovery, in-situ burning and use of dispersants) can be implemented as effectively in Arctic environments as 
in more temperate regions. The most extensive research effort to date, was conducted via the Arctic Response 
Technology (ART) Joint Industry Program (JIP 2012 - 2017) which included 34 research projects and resulted 
in very comprehensive reports covering the following six fundamental elements of Oil Spill Response in Arctic 
areas: http://arcticresponse.wpengine.com/reports/ 
 Mechanical recovery; 
 In situ burning; 
 Dispersants; 
 Trajectory modelling; 
 Remote sensing; 
 Environmental effects. 
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9 Conclusions 
In 2008, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) released the first-ever wide-ranging assessment of 
Arctic oil and gas resources, estimating that about 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13% of the 
world’s undiscovered oil are found north of the Arctic Circle. Although until present, few fields have entered 
into production, the big perspectives for extensive offshore hydrocarbon development have established Arctic 
as a major player in the global oil & gas market. 
It is a fact, that Arctic resource development remains extremely risky and costly. Over the last decades there 
has been a continuous research activity in order to make Oil & Gas operations in the Arctic safer and 
economically viable. The present report, as a part of this research effort, aims to provide an overview of the 
state-of-the-art innovative safety systems and most recent technologies and procedures for the prevention, 
mitigation and emergency response in case of accidents during offshore operations in the Arctic. As an 
outcome of all the topics that were analysed in the Chapters of this report, the following conclusions can be 
made: 
 The Arctic offers geopolitical stability which is essential for the development of the Oil & Gas 
industry. Any territorial disputes that have arisen in the past were resolved peacefully between the 
Arctic countries. 
 Despite the undeniable technological advancements of the last decades, oil spill response 
techniques in the remote and ice covered Arctic waters, cannot be as effective as in more temperate 
waters. Oil spill response capability in the Arctic is a major issue. 
 The available detection and monitoring systems are not capable yet to provide an accurate and real 
time image of a possible oil spill over the wide range of ice conditions that may be encountered in 
the Arctic. 
 Ice covered waters, and the relatively short food chain, make the Arctic ecosystem more vulnerable 
to oil pollution than other ecosystems in more temperate waters. The environmental consequences 
of a possible large oil spill to the Arctic ecosystem would be dramatic.   
 Despite the fact that oil & gas industry applies a strong safety and environmental management 
system, accidents in offshore installations in Arctic are still occurring.  
Ultimately, the present report highlights the imperative need for a close collaboration between the Arctic 
counties (and the industry) in order to overcome the existing regulation (and knowledge) gaps which 
characterize modern oil & gas operations in the Arctic seas. 
The survey reports that oil & gas companies apply the same Safety Management System (SMS) in offshore 
operations in the Arctic as in other more temperate areas. There is not a specific mandatory regime for oil & 
gas operators in the Arctic seas but companies follow standards and good practices built up on their 
accumulated experience.  
Taking into consideration that a number of accidents have occurred in the past years, and that, in the near 
future, offshore oil & gas exploration and production activities in the Arctic are very likely to become more 
intense (and smaller and less experienced companies may get involved in Arctic operations), it becomes 
obvious that the set-up of a Pan-Arctic Competent Authority, able to regulate every offshore operation 
in the Arctic, would be strongly recommended as it would lead to the implementation of a common legislative 
framework. By this way, international standards will be adopted by all operators in the Arctic ensuring that the 
safety level of all oil & gas activities is in accordance with the special Arctic conditions. 
It is also crucial that oil & gas personnel that deal with the demanding working environment of the Arctic has 
the appropriate preparation. At present, the necessary training of the personnel involved in operations in Arctic 
and sub – Arctic areas is directed by each company separately and according to the specifications of each 
project. The establishment of a Centralised Training Centre would contribute largely in the accumulation 
of valuable knowledge and experiences from different sources and to the spread of this knowledge to 
everyone operating in the Arctic. By this way it could be ensured that all personnel have acquired all the 
necessary physical, psychological and cognitive qualifications to work safely in the Arctic. 
Finally, the study underlines the need for an Internationally Coordinated Arctic Research effort. The 
technology that needs to be developed in order to create a reliable oil spill response mechanism for the Arctic 
seas requires the economic and scientific contribution of all the Arctic nations. Moreover, since the Arctic is an 
inherently connected environment, an accident would have impacts in several bordering countries. The ocean 
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circulation, the slower oil biodegradation and the sea ice drift make oil spills a serious environmental issue 
beyond the jurisdiction of a single country. 
 
. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Potential impacts of an accident in an offshore Oil & Gas installation 
Case study: Deepwater Horizon Explosion (20 April 2010, Gulf of Mexico) 
Casualties: 11 crew members 
Non-fatal injuries: 17 crew members 
Public health impacts: Several studies have identified long-term toxic health effects in the workers who 
have been involved in the oil spill clean-up operations. More specifically, persistent alterations in their 
hematological, hepatic, pulmonary, and cardiac functions have been reported, even 7 years after the initial 
exposure. The psychological impacts of the oil spill in the coastal communities should also be referred. 
Several studies have identified that people with spill-related income loss had experienced increased levels of 
tension, anxiety, depression, fatigue, confusion, and total mood disturbance. [20] [21] 
Environmental impacts: It is estimated that nearly 5 million barrels (666.400 tonnes) of crude oil were 
released in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico before the well was capped (87 days later), which is considered 
to be the largest marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry. The oil spill resulted in an oil slick 
ultimately covering more than 112.000 km2 on the ocean's surface leading to various degrees of oiling along 
2.100 km of shoreline in four U.S. states: Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida. Effects-oriented studies 
demonstrated that the oil was toxic to a wide range of organisms like plankton, invertebrates, fish, birds, and 
sea mammals, causing a wide array of adverse effects such as reduced growth, disease, impaired 
reproduction, impaired physiological health, and mortality. [19] 
Security of energy supply: After Deepwater Horizon accident, several countries introduced restrictions on 
offshore oil and gas activities affecting the security of energy supply and the oil prices. For example, in Italy a 
restriction was introduced in 2016 which bans any exploration activity within 12 miles from the coasts of 
Italy. [16] 
Regional economic impacts: The regional fishery industry, has been severely hit. Federal agencies put into 
force fisheries closures and banned fishing for several months in areas of the Gulf which have been affected 
by the oil spill and the applied dispersants. The tourism industry was also impacted heavily by the oil spill. 
Estimates of lost tourism and “brand damage” due to the oil spill were projected to cost the Gulf coastal 
economy up to $22.7 billion through 2013. [18] [22] 
Direct economic losses for the operator (BP): Obviously, the first direct loss for the operator was the 
total loss of a state-of-the-art drilling rig, valued at $560 million. Nevertheless, the biggest economic losses 
for the operator were attributed to settlement of civil damages claims. In an eight-year period (till January 
2018) BP had paid around $65 billion in court-ordered compensations to oil spill victims. [15] 
Indirect economic losses for the operator (BP): The accident resulted in significant reduction of the 
operator’s shareholder wealth. The BP’s share price has fallen up to 55% just two months after the accident - 
from $59.48 a share (19 April 2010) to $27 a share (25 June 2010). Moreover, in November 2012 the U.S. 
government banned BP from new federal contracts. As a result, BP could not supply military fuel or 
participate in new contracts for drilling tracts.  The ban was lifted 2 years later in March 2014. [23] [24] 
Economic losses for the Oil & Gas industry: The U.S. Department of the Interior enacted the Deepwater 
Moratorium on 30 May 2010, effectively halting all deep-water exploratory drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. The 
ban was lifted in 12 October 2010, but by February 2011 no one had received a permit to drill because those 
applying had to prove the ability to contain a spill. A study conducted by the Louisiana State University (July 
2010) assessed that the Deepwater Moratorium would result in the loss of 12.000 oil related jobs and in total 
economic loss of $2.7 billion for the U.S.A. over the first six months. [25] 
It is worth to be mentioned: 
 ‘’As a result of our investigation, we conclude: The explosive loss of the Macondo well could have been 
prevented.’’ (Report to the President - January 2011) [14] 
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Annex 2. Landmark accidents in offshore Oil & Gas installations 
Highest casualties recorded 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
27 Mar 1980 Alexander L. Kielland North Sea, Norway Structural Failure 123 
Reports 
https://officerofthewatch.com/2013/04/29/alexander-l-kielland-platform-capsize-accident/ 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
3 Nov 1989 Seacrest Drillship Gulf of Thailand Storm 91 
Reports 
http://journals.library.mun.ca/ojs/index.php/prototype/article/download/410/508 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
15 Feb 1982 Ocean Ranger Grand Banks Canada Storm 84 
Reports 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.822.9073&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
25 Oct 1983 Glomar Java Sea South China Sea Storm 81 
Reports 
https://www.shipsandoil.co.uk/accident-reports-introduction/the-glomar-java-sea-accident 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
25 Nov 1979 Bohai 2 Gulf of Bohai, China Storm 72 
Reports 
http://members.home.nl/the_sims/rig/bohai2.htm 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
6 Nov 1986 Chinook Helicopter North Sea, UK Mechanical Failure 45 
Reports 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422fdb840f0b61342000861/2-1988_G-BWFC.pdf 
 
 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalitie
s 
6 Jul 1988 Piper Alpha North Sea, UK Human Error 167 
Reports 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/piper-alpha-public-inquiry-volume1.pdf 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/piper-alpha-public-inquiry-volume2.pdf 
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Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
16 Aug 1984 Enchova Central Campos Basin, Brazil Blowout 42 
Reports 
http://members.home.nl/the_sims/rig/enchova.htm 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
30 Jun 1964 C.P. Baker Gulf of Mexico Blowout 22 
Reports 
http://members.home.nl/the_sims/rig/cpbaker.htm 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
27 Jul 2005 Mumbai High North Mumbai High, India Human Error 22 
Reports 
https://journals.library.mun.ca/ojs/index.php/prototype/article/viewFile/468/536 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
23 Oct 2007 Usumacinta Gulf of Mexico Storm 22 
Reports 
https://www.academia.edu/1981028/Usumacinta_Accident_Report 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
2 Oct 1980 Hasbah Platform Persian Gulf Blowout 19 
Reports 
https://incidentnews.noaa.gov/incident/6258#! 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
 1996 Ubit Platform Nigeria Fire 18 
Reports 
http://energykavan.ir/images/DL/Evaluating-accidents-in-the-offshore-drilling-of-petroleum.pdf 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
9 Oct 1974  Gemini jack-up Nigeria Leg failure 18 
Reports 
http://energykavan.ir/images/DL/Evaluating-accidents-in-the-offshore-drilling-of-petroleum.pdf 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
27 Dec 1965 Sea Gem North Sea, UK Fatigue - Collapse 13 
Reports 
http://members.home.nl/the_sims/rig/seagem.htm 
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Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
20 April 2010 Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico Blowout 11 
Reports 
https://www.nrt.org/sites/2/files/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
20 Mar 2001 Petrobas P36 Campos Basin, Brazil Human Error 11 
Reports 
https://journals.library.mun.ca/ojs/index.php/prototype/article/download/499/554 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/csp/v34n4/en_1678-4464-csp-34-04-e00034617.pdf 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
10 May 1979 Ranger I Gulf of Mexico Fatigue - Collapse 8 
Reports 
http://members.home.nl/the_sims/rig/ranger1.htm 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Fatalities 
1 Mar 1976 Deep Sea Driller North Sea, Norway Storm 6 
Reports 
http://members.home.nl/the_sims/rig/dsd.htm 
 
Biggest oil spills recorded 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Oil Spill 
(tonnes) 
20 April 2010 Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico Blowout 666.400 
Reports 
https://www.nrt.org/sites/2/files/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Oil Spill 
(tonnes) 
3 Jun 1979 Sedco 135F (Ixtoc 1) Gulf of Mexico Blowout 476.000 
Reports 
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1136&context=ma_etds 
https://www.marine.usf.edu/documents/Jernlov1981IXTOC.pdf 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Oil Spill 
(tonnes) 
10 Feb 1983 Nowruz field platform  Persian Gulf 1. Collision 
2. Act of war 
272.000 
Reports 
https://response.restoration.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/Oil_Spill_Case_Histories.pdf 
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Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Oil Spill 
(tonnes) 
16 Sep 2004 Taylor Energy platform Gulf of Mexico Hurricane Ivan Active 
Reports 
https://nypost.com/2018/10/23/14-year-long-gulf-of-mexico-oil-spill-to-become-worst-in-us-history/ 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Oil Spill 
(tonnes) 
6 Jul 1979 Shell Storage Tank 6 Forcados, Nigeria Accidental rupture 79.000 
Reports 
https://royaldutchshellplc.com/2011/12/22/when-shell-flushed-100000-tonnes-of-forcados-crude-into-
the-sea/ 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Oil Spill 
(tonnes) 
17 Jan1980 Funiwa No.5 Niger Delta, Nigeria Blowout 26.000 
Reports 
http://krepublishers.com/02-Journals/JHE/JHE-28-0-000-09-Web/JHE-28-3-000-09-Abst-PDF/JHE-28-
03-177-09-1964-Aghalino-S-O/JHE-28-03-177-09-1964-Aghalino-S-O-Tt.pdf 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Oil Spill 
(tonnes) 
21 Aug 2009 West Atlas Timor Sea - Austalia Well head leak 23.630 
Reports 
https://www.lawyersalliance.com.au/documents/item/412 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Oil Spill 
(tonnes) 
22 Apr 1977 Ekofisk Bravo North Sea Blowout 15.000 
Reports 
http://members.home.nl/the_sims/rig/ekofiskb.htm 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Oil Spill 
(tonnes) 
28 Jan 1969 Platform Alpha Santa Barbara, U.S.A Blowout 13.600 
Reports 
http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~kclarke/Papers/SBOilSpill1969.pdf 
 
Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Oil Spill 
(tonnes) 
2 Oct 1980 Hasbah Platform Persian Gulf Blowout 13.000 
Reports 
https://incidentnews.noaa.gov/incident/6258#! 
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Accident Date Name of unit Location Cause of accident Oil Spill 
(tonnes) 
12 Jan 1998 Mobil - Idoho Akwa Ibom, Nigeria Pipeline leak 6.000 
Reports 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286408739_Analysis_of_potential_effects_of_the_Idoho-
QIT_oil_spill_on_river-estuarine_fisheries_in_Nigeria 
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Annex 3. List of Oil Spill Prevention & Response Research Projects 
 
Program name: Arctic Oil Spill Response Technology - Joint Industry Program (JIP) 
Start date – End date: 2012 – 2017 
Coordinator International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) 
Reports: http://arcticresponse.wpengine.com/reports/ 
 
Objectives: 1. To improve Arctic oil spill response capabilities focusing on the 
following key areas: Dispersants, Environmental Effects, Trajectory 
Modelling, Remote Sensing, Mechanical Recovery, In-Situ Burning. 
 
2. To better understand the environmental issues involved in selecting 
and implementing the most effective response strategies. 
 
Program name: Oil in Ice - Joint Industry Program (JIP) 
Start date – End date: 2006 – 2009 
Coordinator Sintef 
Reports: https://www.sintef.no/projectweb/jip-oil-in-ice/publications/ 
 
Objectives: To develop knowledge, tools and technologies for environmental beneficial 
oil spill response strategies for ice-covered waters. 
 
Program name: Oil Spill Response Research (OSRR) – Arctic 
Start date – End date: On going 
Coordinator Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE - U.S.A.) 
Reports: https://www.bsee.gov/site-page/arctic-oil-spill-response-research 
 
Objectives: For more than 25 years, BSEE (and former organizations) have aggressively 
maintained a comprehensive, long-term research program dedicated to 
improving oil spill response options. The major focus of the program is to 
improve the methods and technologies used for oil spill detection, 
containment, treatment, recovery and cleanup.  
 
Program name: Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative (GoMRI) Research Program 
Start date – End date: 2010 - Ongoing 
Coordinator Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative 
Reports: http://research.gulfresearchinitiative.org/research-awards/ 
 
Objectives: Shortly after the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, BP announced a commitment 
of up to $500 million over ten years to fund an independent research 
program designed to study the impact of the oil spills on the environment 
and public health in the Gulf of Mexico. 
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Program name: Oil Spill Response Science (OSRS) 
Start date – End date: 2017 -2019 
Coordinator Government of Canada 
Reports: https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/funding/21146 
 
Objectives: 1. Development of an Integrated Mechanical Recovery and Oil Spill 
Response System for Heavy Oil in Cold and Ice Prone Marine 
Environments. 
 
2. Development of In-Situ Foam Filtration System for Oil Spill 
Recovery. 
 
3. Advanced Membrane-Based Hybrid Process for Oil Spill Removal in 
Marine Environments. 
 
4. The Development of Hybrid Rapid Response Agents to Mitigate the 
Impact of Oil Spills in Marine Environments. 
 
Program name: Joint Industry Oil Spill Preparedness & Response Task Force (OSPR 
JITF) 
Start date – End date: 2010 - 2015 
Coordinator American Petroleum Institute (API) 
Reports: http://www.oilspillprevention.org/oil-spill-research-and-development-cente 
 
Objectives: To identify potential opportunities for improvement to the oil spill response 
system. The program consists of the following seven work-streams, the first 
five of which are relevant to Arctic offshore operations: Spill Response 
Planning, Oil Sensing and Tracking, Dispersants, In-Situ Burning, Mechanical 
Recovery, Shoreline Protection, Alternative Response Technologies. 
 
Program name: DEMO 2000 
Start date – End date: 1999 – On going 
Coordinator The Research Council of Norway 
Reports: Not published 
Objectives: Basic priority of the program is to develop knowledge and technology to 
solve particular challenges in the currently opened areas of the Norwegian 
parts of the Barents Sea, including cold weather, shallow reservoirs, 
carbonates, long distances and logistics, and emissions to the external 
environment. 
 
Program name: Barents Sea Exploration Collaboration (BaSEC) 
Start date – End date: 2015 -2018 
Coordinator Steering Committee of BaSEC 
Reports: https://www.norskoljeoggass.no/naringspolitikk/basec/ 
 
Objectives: To find solutions that lead to robust exploration activity in the Barents Sea. 
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Program name: Petromaks 2 
Start date – End date: 2013 -2022 
Coordinator The Research Council of Norway 
Reports: Not published 
Objectives: To promote knowledge creation and industrial development to enhance 
value creation for society by ensuring the development and optimal 
management of Norwegian petroleum resources within an environmentally 
sustainable framework. The Arctic areas are among the thematic priority 
areas of the program. 
 
Program name: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) 
Start date – End date: 1991 – On going 
Coordinator Arctic Council 
Reports: https://www.amap.no/documents/doc/assessment-2007-oil-and-gas-
activities-in-the-arctic-effects-and-potential-effects.-volume-1/776 
 
https://www.amap.no/documents/doc/assessment-2007-oil-and-gas-
activities-in-the-arctic-effects-and-potential-effects.-volume-2/100 
 
Objectives: The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) is a program 
designed to deliver sound science-based information for use in policy- and 
decision-making. AMAP is a permanent working group of the Arctic Council. 
 
Project name: Employing Chemical Herders to Improve Oil Spill Response 
Operations 
Start date – End date: 2008 - 2010 
Coordinator Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEM 
–U.S.A.) 
Report: https://www.bsee.gov/sites/bsee.gov/files/osrr-oil-spill-response-
research//617aa.pdf 
 
Objectives: 1. Research the use of herding agents in pack ice to enhance 
mechanical recovery of spilled oil with skimmers. 
 
2. Conduct preliminary experiments to determine the feasibility of 
using herders to clear oil from marsh areas. 
 
3. Carry out experiments to study if applying chemical herders around 
oil slicks on the open ocean could improve the operational 
effectiveness of subsequent dispersant application. 
 
Project name: Effects of Dispersed Oil in Cold Environments 
Start date – End date: 2009 - 2011 
Coordinators University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF), NewFields (NF) 
Report: http://neba.arcticresponsetechnology.org/media/1109/jip-ph-1-2-final-
report-12-04-11.pdf 
 
Objectives: To evaluate biodegradation and toxicity of dispersed oil in cold water 
environments of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas. 
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Project name: ACCESS 
Arctic Climate Change, Economy and Society  
Start date – End date: 2011 - 2015 
Coordinator: Pierre and Marie Curie University  (UPMC)  - Paris 6 
Reports: http://www.access-eu.org/en/deliverables2/wp4.html 
 
Objectives: It is the main objective of WP4 of the project to provide a detailed 
assessment of the opportunities and multiple risks of hydrocarbon 
extraction in the Arctic Ocean. 
 
Project name: GRACE   
 Integrated oil spill response and environmental effects 
Start date – End date: 2016 - 2019 
Coordinator: Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE) 
Reports: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/200292_en.html 
 
Objectives: To develop, compare and evaluate the effectiveness and environmental 
effects of different oil spill response methods in a cold climate. In addition 
to this, to develop a system for the real-time observation of underwater oil 
spills and a strategic tool for choosing oil spill response methods. 
 
Project name: BIOPADE 
Biological Impact of Oil Pollution in Arctic and Deep-sea 
Environment 
Start date – End date: 2017 - 2019 
Coordinator: Akvaplan Niva A.S. 
Reports: Not published 
Objectives: This project focuses on the potential biological impacts of anthropogenic 
activities in new oil exploration and production areas, mainly situated in 
Arctic and deep-sea marine environments.  
 
Project name: Force 7 
Start date – End date: 2013 - 2015 
Coordinator: Rina Consulting S.P.A. 
Reports: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/106833_en.html 
 
Objectives: To develop a high performance oil spill recovery system suitable to 
effectively operate in rough sea waters based on improved oleophilic / 
hydrophobic materials. 
 
Project name: SMACC  
 Studies of materials behavior for future cold climate applications 
Start date – End date: 2013 - 2018 
Coordinator: SINTEF 
Reports: https://app.dimensions.ai/details/grant/grant.4647066 
 
Objectives: To develop robust and cost effective materials and solutions for use in 
Arctic areas. 
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Project name: OFFSHORELAW 
The International Law of Offshore Construction: Cutting Through 
Fragmented Legal Regimes Towards Better Governance 
Start date – End date: 2012 - 2014 
Coordinator: Utrecht University 
Reports: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/102831_en.html 
 
Objectives: To clarify the international legal framework that regulates the life of 
offshore constructions in order to provide useful legal tools to both private 
investors and policy makers. 
 
Project name: MORICE 
Mechanical Oil Recovery in Ice-Infested Waters  
Start date – End date 1995 -2002 
Coordinator: SINTEF 
Reports: https://www.bsee.gov/sites/bsee.gov/files/osrr-oil-spill-response-
research//310ae.pdf 
 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0025326X03002066 
 
Objectives: To develop technologies for more effective recovery of oil spills in ice. 
 
Project name: Wendy Schmidt Oil Cleanup XCHALLENGE 
Start date – End date: 2010 - 2011 
Coordinator: X PRIZE Foundation 
Reports: https://www.xprize.org/prizes/oil-cleanup 
 
Objectives: To inspire a new generation of innovative solutions that will speed the pace 
of cleaning up seawater surface oil resulting from spillage from ocean 
platforms, tankers, and other sources. 
 
Project name: e-URready4OS 
Expanded Underwater Robotics Ready for Oil Spills   
Start date – End date: On - going 
Coordinator: European Commission 
Reports: http://www.upct.es/urready4os/?lang=en 
 
Objectives: Expanded Underwater robotics ready for oil spills (e-URready4OS) is an EU 
DG-ECHO co-funded project aimed to join forces to make available to 
European Civil Protection a fleet of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) 
with operational capability to intervene against oil spills in European Seas 
using new cooperative multivehicle robotic technologies.  
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Project name: A UAV SAR System for Oil Spill Detection in the Arctic 
Start date – End date: 2014 - 2015 
Coordinator: NTNU 
Reports: http://www.mechatronics.hials.org/project/a-uav-sar-system-for-oil-spill-
detection-in-the-arctic/ 
 
Objectives: 1. To explore and verify multi-frequency and full-polarimtric SAR for 
oil-in-ice technology. 
 
2. To analyze and design a UAV SAR system. 
 
3. To establish a solid research group on underwater robotics.  
 
Project name: Copernicus 
Start date – End date: On - going 
Coordinator: European Commission 
Reports: https://www.copernicus.eu/en/news/news/copernicus-services-information-
and-sentinel-products-arctic-region 
 
Objectives: Copernicus is the European Union's Earth Observation Programme which 
provides information products via the Sentinel series of satellites. Among 
other tasks, monitoring and forecasting of the Arctic Ocean waters 
conditions is performed. 
 
Project name: ARCSAR 
Start date – End date: 2018 - 2023 
Coordinator: Joint Rescue and Coordination Centre – North Norway 
Reports: http://arcsar.eu/ 
 
Objectives: To establish and support a new Arctic and North Atlantic Security and 
Emergency Preparedness Network (ARCSAR) for practitioners involved in 
front-line security and emergency response, directly involving practitioners, 
existing networks, stakeholders in universities, research centers, and 
industry, and those involved in governance, and policy-making. 
 
Project name: MOSAiC 
Multidisciplinary drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic 
Climate 
Start date – End date: 2019 - 2020 
Coordinator: Alfred Wegener Institute, Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research 
(AWI) 
Reports: https://www.mosaic-expedition.org/ 
 
Objectives: In September 2019 the German research icebreaker Polarstern will depart 
from Tromsø, Norway and, once it has reached its destination, will spend 
the next year drifting through the Arctic Ocean, trapped in the ice. MOSAiC 
will contribute to a quantum leap in our understanding of the coupled Arctic 
climate system and its representation in global climate models. The focus 
of MOSAiC lies on direct in-situ observations of the climate processes that 
couple the atmosphere, ocean, sea ice, bio-geochemistry and ecosystem. 
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Project name: Blue-Action 
Start date – End date: 2016 - 2021 
Coordinator: Danish Meteorological Institute  
Reports: http://www.blue-action.eu/index.php?id=4661 
 
Objectives: 1. To improve our understanding of the impact of a changing Arctic 
on Northern Hemisphere weather and climate. 
 
2. To improve the safety & wellbeing of people in the Arctic and 
across the Northern Hemisphere. 
 
3. To reduce the risks associated with Arctic operations and resource 
exploitation. 
 
4. To support evidence-based decision-making by policymakers 
worldwide. 
 
Project name: Science Based Regulation of Arctic Energy Installations 
Start date – End date: 2017 - 2018 
Coordinator: Nottingham Trent University 
Reports: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FR003203%2F1 
 
Objectives: This grant will facilitate development of a transdisciplinary network of 
academics and stakeholders designed to provide a 360 degree review of 
the governance and regulation of threats and impacts to the environment, 
industry, local communities and other stakeholders associated with offshore 
energy installations in the Arctic. 
 
Project name: RU-NO Barents Project 
Russian – Norwegian Oil & Gas industry cooperation in the High 
North 
Start date – End date: 2012 - 2015 
Coordinator: Norwegian Oil and Gas Partners (INTSOK) 
Reports: https://www.norwep.com/Market-info/Markets/Russia/RU-NO-Project/Project-
Reports 
 
Objectives: The main objective of the RU-NO Barents Project was, through industry 
cooperation and knowledge of Arctic technology needs, to contribute to the 
growth of the Russian and Norwegian industry participation in future 
petroleum endeavors in the High North. The RU-NO Barents Project focused 
on the following five major areas: 
1. Logistics and transport. 
2. Drilling, well operations and equipment. 
3. Environmental protection, monitoring systems and oil spill 
contingency. 
4. Pipelines and subsea installations. 
5. Floating and fixed installations. 
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Project name: Barents 2020 
Start date – End date: 2007 - 2012 
Coordinator: DNV GL 
Reports: https://www.dnvgl.com/oilgas/arctic/barents-2020-reports.html 
 
Objectives: The objective of the Russian-Norwegian Barents 2020 project was to 
recommend standards for oil and gas activities in the Barents Sea which 
would ensure that the safety level would be at least as good as in the North 
Sea. 
 
Program name: NOAA's Arctic Program 
Start date – End date: On going 
Coordinator: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  
U.S. Department of Commerce 
Reports: https://www.arctic.noaa.gov/ 
 
Objectives: NOAA’s Arctic Research Program provides environmental intelligence that 
forms the foundation for understanding the complex Arctic system to 
support effective stewardship, resilient communities and economies. 
 
Program name: IABP 
International Arctic Buoy Programme  
Start date – End date: 1991 – On going 
Coordinator: U.S. Interagency Buoy Program (USIABP)  
Reports: http://iabp.apl.washington.edu/overview_history.html 
 
Objectives: The objective of the International Arctic Buoy Program (IABP) is to establish 
and maintain a network of data buoys in the entire Arctic Ocean to provide 
meteorological, sea ice and oceanographic data for real-time operational 
requirements and research purposes, including support to the World Climate 
Research Program (WCRP) and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) World Weather Watch (WWW) Program. The Program will build upon 
cooperation among agencies and institutions with arctic interests. 
 
Program name: Arctic Research Programme   
Start date – End date: 2010 - 2016 
Coordinator: Natural Environment Research Council (UK) 
Reports: http://arp.arctic.ac.uk/news/published-papers/ 
 
Objectives: To improve capability to predict changes in the Arctic, particularly over 
timescales of months to decades, including regional impacts and potential 
for feedbacks on the global Earth System. 
 
Project name: BaSMIN 
Barents Sea Metocean and Ice data Network 
Start date – End date: 2016 -2018 
Coordinator: Equinor (Statoil) 
Reports: Not Available 
Objectives: The BaSMIN project’s purpose is to understand the effects of environmental 
forces on future offshore fixed and floating installations. Early acquisition 
of ice and metocean data will help oil and gas operators to reduce risks 
when exploring in frontier regions. 
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Project name: Oil Spill Preparedness in Small Communities 
Start date – End date: 2015 – 2017 
Coordinator: Institute of the North 
Reports: https://ppr.arcticinfrastructure.org/ 
 
Objectives: The project “Oil Spill Preparedness in Small Communities” was approved by 
the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) Working 
Group of the Arctic Council in June 2015. The project co-leads Norway, U.S., 
Canada and Aleut International Association developed a community self-
assessment tool that will help EPPR better understand community 
preparedness and risk exposure. 
 
Project name: MOSIDEO 
Microscale interaction of oil with sea ice for detection and 
environmental risk management in sustainable operations 
Start date – End date: 2015 – 2018 
Coordinator: Norut Northern Research Institute 
Reports: https://norut.no/en/prosjekter/microscale-interaction-oil-sea-ice-detection-
and-environmental-risk-management 
 
Objectives: The primary objective of the research project MOSIDEO is to advance our 
knowledge of the interactions between oil and sea ice pore structure and 
develop parametrised description of oil behaviour and its influence on radar 
signals. This is a prerequisite for risk assessment and contingency planning 
of oil spills in sea ice-covered waters. 
 
Project name: Technology for mapping and monitoring of the oceans 
Start date – End date: On going 
Coordinator: NTNU AMOS 
Reports: https://www.ntnu.edu/amos/amos-project-1 
 
Objectives: This project considers modelling, mapping and monitoring of the oceans and 
seabed, and coordinated networked operations; real time processing of 
payload data, intelligent payload systems and sensor fusion; big data 
analytics, machine learning, artificial intelligence. Light climate as que of 
life. 
 
Project name: Marine robotics platforms 
Start date – End date: On going 
Coordinator: NTNU AMOS 
Reports: https://www.ntnu.edu/amos/amos-project-2 
 
Objectives: This project concerns the development of robotic platforms for autonomous 
marine operations and systems. 
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Project name: Risk management and maximized operability of ship and ocean 
structures 
Start date – End date: On going 
Coordinator: NTNU AMOS 
Reports: https://www.ntnu.edu/amos/amos-project-3 
 
Objectives: The focus will be on the development of methods that maximize operability 
with improved risk management. This will be achieved by combining 
advanced numerical hydrodynamic and structural mechanical models for 
analysis, monitoring and control. Application areas include offshore wind 
turbines, aquaculture installations, oil and gas installations, coastal 
infrastructures, coupled multibody, marine structures, marine operations, 
autonomous ships, inspections and installations. 
 
Program name: Ice Management Program 
Start date – End date: 2010 – On going 
Coordinator: Petroleum Research of Newfoundland and Labrador (PRNL) 
Reports: http://petroleumresearch.ca/index.php?id=166 
 
Objectives: Petroleum Research has established a multi-year Ice Management Program 
(IMP) aimed at the development of improved ice management capabilities 
for operations in arctic and harsh environments. 
 
Project name: MAIRES 
Monitoring Arctic Land and Sea Ice using Russian and European 
Satellites 
Start date – End date: 2011 - 2014 
Coordinator: Nansen Environmental and Remote Sensing Center 
Reports: https://maires.nersc.no/ 
 
Objectives: The overall objective of the MAIRES proposal is to develop methodologies 
for satellite monitoring of Arctic glaciers, sea ice and icebergs. The proposal 
will demonstrate the benefits of combining Earth Observation data from 
European and Russian satellites for operational mapping, interpretation and 
forecast of land and sea ice variations in the Eurasian Arctic with 
subsequent applications in the socioeconomic sector. The results of the 
proposal will contribute to improved understanding of changes in land and 
sea ice in response to climate change in the Arctic. The MAIRES project is 
focused on the Barents and Kara Sea region. 
 
Project name: SALTO 
Safe Arctic logistics, transport and operations 
Start date – End date: 2014 - 2017 
Coordinator: Maritime Research Institute Netherlands (MARIN) 
Reports: http://www.marin.nl/web/JIPs-Networks/JIPs-public/SALTO.htm 
 
Objectives: To provide a risk based design tool to help industry to prepare for the Arctic 
environmental conditions (wind, fog, ice, icing) and hence to optimize 
operations of ships and offshore constructions. 
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Project name: The Arctic DP Research Project: Effective Station keeping in Ice 
Start date – End date: 2010 - 2014 
Coordinator: NTNU 
Reports: http://www.mic-journal.no/pdf/2014/MIC-2014-4-1.pdf 
 
Objectives: To strengthen the competences of the Norwegian maritime industry in 
Arctic offshore operations with special focus on dynamic positioning (DP). 
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